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“A NECESSARY COST OF FREEDOM”?
THE INCOHERENCE OF SORRELL V. IMS
Tamara R. Piety∗
ABSTRACT
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court decided an important case that
has been largely overlooked—Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.1 In Sorrell the
Court struck down a Vermont law prohibiting the sale for marketing
purposes of physicians’ prescription records without their permission on
the grounds that the law was not “content neutral.” The majority found
that because the Vermont statute singled out marketing for special
treatment, the law constituted a form of “viewpoint discrimination.” The
First Amendment, Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority opinion, requires
us to tolerate speech we may not like as a “necessary cost of freedom.”
This reading of “content neutrality” makes the commercial speech
doctrine incoherent. By definition the doctrine only applies to speech which
is “commercial”—that is, speech distinguished by its commercial content.
After Sorrell any regulation of marketing could potentially fail the content
neutrality test. Moreover, by casting the marketer as a “disfavored”
speaker by virtue of regulation, Sorrell turns the rationale for the
commercial speech doctrine upside down. The doctrine was not created to
protect commercial speakers. It was created to carve out a limited area of
First Amendment protection for truthful commercial speech in order to
protect consumers’ right to receive accurate product information and to
thereby promote the public interest in a properly functioning market. There
∗
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Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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is no indication in the case establishing the doctrine that the Supreme
Court intended to protect merchants’ sales pitches as if they were
viewpoints. Yet this is what Sorrell seems to provide.
This Article argues that Sorrell’s content neutrality test is misplaced
with respect to commercial speech because it subverts the rationale for
protecting some commercial speech and unduly burdens the government’s
ability to protect the public from marketing practices which undermine
public health, safety, and welfare. The notion that unrestrained freedom for
commercial speech is a “necessary cost of freedom” is not just wrong, it is
dangerously wrong.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Citizens
United2, it cast the corporation into the role of “disfavored” speaker and
thereby signaled it was willing to contemplate an extremely muscular
vision of corporate rights. The decision unleashed a firestorm of protest and
commentary.3 In contrast, the Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS
2.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3.
See, e.g., Brandon S. Boulter, Expensive Speech: Citizens United v. FEC and the Free Speech
Rights, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2243 (2010); Robert B. Sobelman, An Unconstitutional Response to
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Health,4 which similarly expanded corporate rights into an arguably even
more dangerous area, one that strikes at the heart of the government’s
ability to regulate commerce, has generated much less attention.
There were no presidential denouncements of Sorrell and little of the
sort of outraged commentary that characterized the coverage of Citizens
United. The November 2011 issue of the Harvard Law Review does not
even mention it as a “leading case” in the important First Amendment
decisions from 2011.5 Yet in Sorrell the Court substantially extended the
protection given to commercial speech under something known as the
commercial speech doctrine. The commercial speech doctrine was created
in 1976 in a case known as Virginia Pharmacy.6 It announced that truthful
commercial speech enjoyed a limited degree of First Amendment
protection; truthful speech could be regulated, but only if the government
met certain conditions. The controlling test was articulated in 1980 in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York.7 The Central Hudson test provided a four-part test for the
constitutionality of regulation of commercial speech: (1) speech must
“concern lawful activity and not be misleading,” (2) the regulation must be
motivated by a “substantial” government interest, and (3) directly advance
that substantial interest, but (4) do so in a manner “not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.”8

Citizens United: Mandating Shareholder Approval of Corporate Political Expenditures, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 341 (2011).
4.
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
5.
See 125 HARV. L. REV. tbl. of contents (Nov. 2011), available at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/november11/index.php.
6.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The term
“commercial speech doctrine” term can be confusing because it is sometimes used to refer to the
announcement by the Court in a much earlier decision, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54
(1942), that commercial speech received no protection at all under the First Amendment. See Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 627 (1990) (“In
1942, the Supreme Court plucked the commercial speech doctrine out of thin air. The case was
Valentine v. Chrestensen.”) (citations omitted). But see David Vladeck, Lessons From A Story Untold:
Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2004) (describing the Virginia
Pharmacy opinion as the “opening chapter of the [commercial speech] doctrine”) (citations omitted).
See also Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979) (“Until very recently, the Supreme Court refused
to apply the first amendment to ‘commercial speech.’”). However, after Virginia Pharmacy the phrase
is most often used to refer to the rule announced in that case—see, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, A Brief
History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine (With Some Implications for Tobacco Regulation), 2
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 103, 103 (2010)—and that is how I use the term here. For a more
contemporaneous statement that Virginia Pharmacy marks the beginning of what we now know as the
commercial speech doctrine (whether as a completely new thing or as a revision of the prior doctrine),
see Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOK. L. REV.
437, 437-38 (1980).
7.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
8.
Id. at 566.

PIETY 1 - 54 (DO NOT DELETE)

4

10/19/2012 11:27 AM

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 64:1:1

Yet ever since the doctrine was created, it has been the target of
attacks. For the most part, these attacks have been intended not to return
commercial speech to its prior status under which it received no First
Amendment protection,9 but rather to eliminate commercial speech’s
purportedly “second-class citizen” status and to offer it full First
Amendment protection.10 Although the Court has repeatedly declined such
invitations,11 it has, over time, interpreted the Central Hudson test more
strictly so that some commentators have observed that what began life as
an intermediate scrutiny test has evolved into a strict scrutiny test in all but
name.12 With Sorrell the Supreme Court finally gave industry most of what
it sought in earlier cases by essentially rendering the Central Hudson test
irrelevant and engrafting a content neutrality test onto the commercial
speech doctrine that will likely make it easier to invalidate any regulation
of commercial speech. Sorrell may mean that henceforth, in practice, if not
formally, commercial speech will be treated as fully protected.13
For this reason Sorrell is likely to have far-reaching consequences. I
very briefly sketched out some of those consequences in an earlier
reaction14 to Citizens United,15 a decision which contained similar antidiscrimination rhetoric and presaged the outcome in Sorrell.16 Here I
discuss the intellectual foundations of the commercial speech doctrine, its
history and justifications, along with the various other forces that led us to

9.
One of the most notable exceptions is the Jackson and Jeffries article, supra note 6. Jackson
and Jeffries argued that Virginia Pharmacy was wrongly decided insofar as it elevated commercial
speech to the status of protected speech under the First Amendment because they thought commercial
speech did not implicate any of the interests the First Amendment was meant to protect. Id. at 5–6. They
further argued, as I do here, that First Amendment protection for commercial speech threatens to
resurrect the discredited Lochner-era substantive due process review of economic regulation. Id. at 30–
33.
10.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 786 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to
commercial speech rights as second class First Amendment rights).
11.
Most recently in 2003 in Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
12.
Vladeck, supra note 6 at 1059.
13.
Others have argued that Sorrell has similarly troubling implications for the protection of
privacy. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of
Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855 (2011). For the distinction between economic and personal rights, see
Ernest A. Young, Sorrell v. IMS Health and the End of the Constitutional Double Standard, 36 VT. L.
REV. 903 (2011). Others have celebrated the decision as one upholding core First Amendment
principles. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Uncensored Discourse Is Not Just for Politics, 36 Vt. L. Rev. 845
(2011).
14.
Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16 (2010), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/citizens-unitedand-the-threat-to-the-regulatory-state (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).
15.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
16.
See Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC’s Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,
Yeager v. AT&T Mobility, 2011 WL 3847178 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2011) (No. CIV. S–07–2517 KJM
GGH PS), 2011 WL 3383506 at *4 (arguing that Sorrell is the case I predicted would emerge from the
reasoning used in Citizens United).
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the major doctrinal shift in Sorrell, a shift that transforms a fairly prosaic
regulation of commerce into what sounds like a civil rights case.17 Yet
treating global pharmaceutical companies as if they were embattled, underrepresented minorities risks trivializing the real life-and-death struggles of
plaintiffs who are in fact relatively powerless and elides the Court’s
exercise of its counter-majoritarian power on behalf of the powerful.
Moreover, Sorrell completes what has been a decades-long process of
turning the rationale for commercial speech doctrine upside down by
putting the speaker, rather than the public interest, at the center of the
analysis. It completes what I call has been a “bait-and-switch” whereby the
protection for commercial speech was offered under one justification, but
once it was granted, has morphed into something completely different.18
This is something different than the normal evolution of a doctrine in the
common law tradition. Rather, Sorrell’s reasoning eviscerates the rationale
on which Virginia Pharmacy was based—protection of listeners’
interests—and substitutes for it a rationale which elevates the interests of
commercial speakers over that of listeners, such that even where the speech
presents a detriment to listeners, it is protected because of its value to the
speaker. Because this reading of the First Amendment is inconsistent with
much regulation of commerce, particularly consumer protection regulation,
it seems unlikely the Court ever intended to establish such a principle.
Instead listeners’ interests served as the attractive “bait” to garner a ruling
that later served as a basis to persuade the Court to “switch” to the rationale
offered in Sorrell.
Sorrell is the case I predicted Citizens United might generate. It may
have gotten comparatively less attention than Citizens United because the
Court in Sorrell was less forthright in signaling that it was making new law
than it was in Citizens United, but it may also be because the facts and the
background of Sorrell seemed complicated or technical or of limited

17.
In some sense this is not “new” because, as will be discussed in more detail below, these
arguments started being made almost at the outset of the creation of the commercial speech doctrine.
But it is only since the early 1990s that the case law began reflecting some of this tone and only since
2010 and the Citizens United case that the Court seems to be prepared to take the rhetoric to its farthest
logical conclusion. On the use of civil rights rhetoric in the service of new and unexpected
beneficiaries, see Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 690 (2005) (“[T]hey [new generation conservatives] too discovered
that they could turn the liberal rhetoric of the Civil Rights Movement and the Rights Revolution to new
purposes.”). On another exploration of the rightward shift, loosely speaking, of the use of the First
Amendment, see Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO.
L. REV. 935 (1993).
18.
I am using the term “bait-and-switch” as a metaphor because it seems so apt. However, I do not
think that there was an explicit plan by any person, entity or industry to foist this doctrine on the public
through deception about its justifications, although the Powell Memorandum, see infra note 221, might
suggest some degree of coordination. Rather, I think this was perhaps a case of unintended
consequences.
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interest if you were not a physician or in pharmaceutical marketing. The
case involved Vermont’s attempt to limit the sale of physician-identified
prescription records to data-mining companies where that information
would ultimately be used for marketing purposes. Data mining is one of
many tools pharmaceutical companies use to market brand-name drugs.
Because heavier use of brand-name drugs over generics raises the cost of
health care, Vermont wanted to regulate this practice. The Supreme Court
held Vermont could not do so because in singling out marketing for special
treatment it infringed on the rights of data miners and pharmaceutical
companies to collect, sell and ultimately to use this data.
In what follows I describe the links between the commercial speech
doctrine and the emergence of corporate political speech, the vision of the
corporation as a legitimate rights holder and participant in the political
process, and why Citizens United in turn influenced the Court’s
interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine in a way that turned that
doctrine on its head. Part I describes the background against which the
Vermont legislation was passed and the public health and welfare issues
pharmaceutical marketing may raise, while Part II focuses specifically on
Sorrell and how the Supreme Court characterized the dispute as one of
disputed “viewpoints,” thereby fundamentally reframing the rights and
interests protected under the commercial speech doctrine.
Part III describes the bait in this bait-and-switch—the intellectual
foundations for the commercial speech doctrine. Part IV describes how the
Court took the bait and created the commercial speech doctrine. It follows
the doctrine’s development to the present and notes how Chief Justice
Rehnquist repeatedly (and presciently) argued that this new doctrine
threatened government’s legitimate power to regulate commerce and how,
from the beginning, the doctrine was plagued by definitional difficulties,
difficulties which illustrate that the entire doctrine depends on contentbased distinctions, even if the Court has never offered clear guidance on
what makes speech “commercial.”
Part V describes how the “switch” to a more speaker-oriented
protection came about, describing the scholarly work that argued that
protection for freedom of expression necessarily entailed an equality
principle. This argument provided the intellectual foundation for first
extending protection to corporate participation in political speech, a
development which then migrated back to the commercial speech context
so that a doctrine which was justified on the basis of protection for
consumers shifted to one which protected speakers’ interests, even where
such speech was at the consumers’ expense or where they did not wish to
receive it.
Finally, Part VI brings together these threads and argues that Sorrell’s
reasoning cannot be reconciled with the concept of a commercial speech
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doctrine and is therefore incoherent, and that it has troubling implications
for a great many areas of heretofore well-settled areas of regulatory
authority, in particular, the existing regulation of off-label use marketing of
pharmaceutical drugs.
To understand the significance of Sorrell, we must begin by looking at
why data mining is so important for pharmaceutical companies and how the
sale of data implicates speech in any way (since it is not immediately
apparent) and how the sale of data becomes speech for purposes of the First
Amendment. Data mining is (or was) an integral part of pharmaceutical
marketing.
I. PHARMACEUTICAL SALES: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILING

“Detailing” is the name given the work done by pharmaceutical sales
reps in promoting prescription drugs to doctors to prescribe to their
patients.19 America was introduced to the seemingly no-holds-barred world
of detailing in the movie Love and Other Drugs.20 There Jake Gyllenhaal
plays Jamie Randall, a breezy, cheerful ladies’ man skating through life on
patter and charm, one who rarely stays in one place long enough for his lies
to catch up with him. The movie opens with Jamie fleeing his job selling
electronics when his boss discovers Jamie having sex with his wife. Jamie,
we learn, is something of an underachiever, a slacker who in his family’s
view isn’t living up to his potential and doesn’t really want to. What he
wants is to make the maximum amount of money for the minimum amount
of effort, with plenty of time reserved for casual sex, recreational drugs,
and drinking. Jamie has a flexible relationship with the truth and little
concern for following rules; this, it turns out, means he is particularly well
suited for a career in pharmaceutical marketing.
While ostensibly being about a romance between a pharmaceutical
sales rep and a young woman diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease, Love
and Other Drugs is most interesting as an exposé of the way
pharmaceutical companies market prescription drugs. In the movie the
“detailers” are ruthless competitors who will use any means, fair or foul, to
get their product into the right doctors’ hands. They accost doctors in the
parking lot and offer free pens, umbrellas, lunch, and, most importantly,
free samples of their drugs.21 Our hero, Jamie, uses all manner of snooping
19.
Julie M. Donahue et al., Effects of Pharmaceutical Promotion on Adherence to the Treatment
Guidelines for Depression, 42 MED. CARE 1176, 1176 (2004).
20.
LOVE AND OTHER DRUGS (Twentieth Century Fox 2010) (based on the book Hard Sell: The
Evolution of a Viagra Salesman by Jamie Reidy). See JAMIE REIDY, HARD SELL: THE EVOLUTION OF A
VIAGRA SALESMAN (2005).
21.
One of the hazards of writing about the pharmaceutical industry is that it is fairly volatile.
Some report that the practice of detailing itself is in decline. See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Pfizer Cuts
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and skullduggery to attempt to worm his way into the relevant doctors’
good graces. The doctors are portrayed as cynically putting up token
resistance but ultimately extracting the maximum benefit from the drug
rep’s desperation to have them adopt and prescribe his company’s drug.
The fictional Jamie steals competitors’ drugs, lies to obtain patients’
records, woos members of the staff of the physicians he visits, and engages
in all sorts of other behavior of questionable ethics in order to gain a
competitive advantage.
Real life isn’t that different from fiction it seems. The movie was based
on Hard Sell: The Evolution of a Viagra Salesman,22 the memoir of Jamie
Reidy, a former Viagra sales rep. (The main difference between the book
and the movie was that there was no love story in the book.) In Hard Sell
Reidy recounts a plethora of tactics he used to try to get doctors to adopt
his employer’s drugs. Among them was the marketing tactic at issue in
Sorrell—using data mining to track which drugs doctors prescribe. Just as
in all sales, Reidy says, “closing” is a critical part of pharmaceutical
marketing.23 But unlike other sales contexts in which a sales pitch is
concluded when the customer signs a contract or walks out with the
product, in pharmaceutical sales it is difficult to know whether your sales
pitch was effective because the sale is only complete when the doctor
writes a prescription for your drug.24 So, using a time-tested selling
technique, the detailer tries to get the doctor to make a commitment to
prescribing X drug for the next ten patients who present with the condition
for which the drug is marketed.25 Perhaps because people prefer to view
themselves as persons who honor commitments, if you get an explicit
commitment from a doctor that she will prescribe a drug in the future, she
is more likely to do so than if no promise is extracted.26 But to measure the
effectiveness of this tactic, detailers need to know if the doctor has actually
kept that promise.
Here is where data mining comes in. “Pharmaceutical companies pay
hundreds of thousands of dollars to third-party firms that gather sales data

Employee Severance Packages, PHARMALOT BLOG (Apr. 6, 2012, 8:36 AM),
http://www.pharmalot.com/2012/04/pfizer-cuts-employee-severance-packages/. This decline does not
mean drug companies are cutting back on marketing, merely that spending may be shifting to other
areas. See also Ed Silverman, The Death of the Sales Rep is Greatly Exaggerated, PHARMALOT BLOG
(Dec. 5, 2011, 8:51 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/12/the-death-of-the-sales-rep-is-greatlyexaggerated/. See also Timothy Stolltzfus Jost, Oversight of Marketing Relationships Between
Physicians and the Drug and Device Industry: A Comparative Study, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 333–34
(2010) (describing detailing practice).
22.
REIDY, supra note 20.
23.
Id. at 32.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 57–113 (rev. ed. 2007).
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from the nation’s pharmacy chains; reps get detailed reports informing
them how many prescriptions—of their own drugs, as well as those of their
competitors—each doctor has written in a particular week.”27 This allows
the rep who discovers that a promise hasn’t been honored to police the
promise: “Now, Doctor, last month you agreed to try Zithromax in your
next ten otitis media patients. What stopped you from doing so?”28
If it is true, as the research and the practices of the industry suggest,
that an initial promise to prescribe a particular drug will generate more
compliance than a sales encounter that does not end in a promise because
people care about keeping their promises, it would seem to follow that the
ability to follow-up on that promise and (in effect) ask people “why didn’t
you keep your promise?” would be even more effective. The “third-party”
data miners who make this follow-up possible are called prescription drug
information intermediaries (PDII).29
IMS Health, Inc., the plaintiff in the Sorrell case, is one such
prescription drug information intermediary. It gathers information from
pharmacies about the prescriptions doctors write. Although the patients’
names in the data are protected in accordance with the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), prescribers’ names
are not scrubbed.30 Thus, IMS and other PDIIs can organize the data by
physician and by drug, so it is possible to see what drugs, and how much of
each, every doctor is prescribing.31 Companies like IMS Health then buy
lists of licensed physicians from the AMA and cross-reference these
records against the records obtained from the pharmacies, analyze and
summarize all of this data, and then sell it back to interested parties.32
Although some purchasers are universities, government, and law
enforcement, the primary market for this data is made up of pharmaceutical
companies.33
Armed with this information, the pharmaceutical company’s detailer
can go into the sales call with more knowledge about the doctor’s
prescribing practices than the doctor herself may have.34 “Sales
27.
REIDY, supra note 20, at 32.
28.
Id. at 32–33 (italics in the original).
29.
IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153, 158 (D. Me. 2007).
30.
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011) (defining “protected health information” as “individually
identifiable health information,” which includes demographic information, health condition, and
payment, but not prescribers’ names); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d) (2011) (explaining that de-identified
protected health information may be disclosed).
31.
REIDY, supra note 20, at 32.
32.
Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of Prescribing Data for Drug
Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1248 (2011).
33.
Id.
34.
Reidy notes that “[m]any physicians are unaware that their reps have access to [their
prescription] information.” REIDY, supra note 20, at 32.
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representatives can use the information to identify physicians who are high
or low prescribers and early or late adopters, to decide which points to
emphasize in their presentations, and to assess how effective their visits
have been in modifying prescribing behavior.”35
Predictably, many doctors feel this practice is incredibly intrusive.36 As
one witness testified, having the detailer know so much information about
his prescription practices “puts me at a disadvantage that I’m not
comfortable being at.”37 Moreover, the evidence adduced in the cases
litigating statutes like that of Vermont demonstrates that the purpose of
data mining is to stimulate the sales of brand-name drugs.38 Studies suggest
that “detailing has ‘a significant effect on physician prescription
behavior.’”39 Presumably, at least in the industry’s view, data mining
contributes to that success.
On the surface this practice seems relatively benign because it enables
companies to measure their results and thus to pitch drugs more effectively
and efficiently and to minimize the waste of doctors’ time by, for example,
reserving pitches for drugs to control diabetes to those doctors who have a
great many patients with diabetes and not bothering to pitch it to those who
don’t. Yet, as noted above, doctors often feel it impinges on their privacy.
Data mining gives the detailer insight into the physician’s practice that he
might prefer the detailer not have, not to mention that it permits the rep to
manipulate the doctor’s response through the tactics of the hard sell. Data
mining creates an asymmetry of information between the rep and the doctor
that makes many doctors feel uncomfortable.40
As an illustration, imagine this scenario: you are buying a new car. You
go to the salesroom and make an offer. At some point in the negotiation,

35.
Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, supra note 32.
36.
Although, as noted above, some survey evidence suggests that overall many doctors still find
sales reps visits “very useful and of value” or “somewhat useful and of value.” See Silverman, The
Death of the Sales Rep, supra note 21.
37.
IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 90 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lipez, J., concurring and
dissenting) (testimony of Dr. Gary Sobelson, a family practice physician).
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 71 (quoting Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-toPhysician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 785, 809 (2005)).
40.
Some have suggested to me that, to the extent many doctors welcomed detailing visits and all
the free gifts and perks that came their way as a result of them, we should not be overly solicitous of the
invasion of their privacy. There is no question that some (many?) doctors were complicit in
encouraging the practice of detailing because of the perceived benefits. Yet there have always been
some who objected to the practice and more still who, while perhaps enjoying some aspects of
detailing, objected to what they viewed as an invasion of privacy. There are other doctors who profess
to be not at all concerned about data mining. I do not attempt here to sort out what proportion of the
profession objects or whether the failure to object to detailing as a whole ought to moot any objection to
data mining. It is enough for my purposes here to observe that some physicians did object to having
their data used this way and looked to the Vermont Legislature for relief.
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the salesman goes to “see the manager” to discuss your offer and leaves
you and your spouse alone in his office. While you are alone the two of you
discuss the car, your real bottom line, all the issues you are concerned
about, what you really liked, and what you are willing to give on. Imagine
if, unbeknownst to you, the room is bugged so that the salesman has heard
everything you said. He can now come back into the room and seem to
magically know what you want and how far you can be pushed. Some
doctors feel that having detailers know so much about their prescribing
practices is like having that salesman listening in on your private
conversation; it is an invasion of privacy that tilts the scales toward the
seller.
This is not all. Detailers try to promote their drugs for use in the widest
possible population of patients, sometimes without proper regard for
patient well-being. “Products that doctors prescribe in response to
marketing may or may not be the most appropriate for particular patients.
Patients who are prescribed inappropriate drugs may, of course, suffer side
effects or experience no remediation or even an aggravation of their
medical conditions.”41 Moreover, anything that artificially inflates the
prescription of brand-name drugs may jeopardize patients’ health when
they receive “new drugs for which safety and effectiveness data are
limited.”42 “Several widely-publicized incidents in recent years have
involved heavily marketed drugs such as VIOXX that turned out to be
dangerous or ineffective.”43
Critics of the practice argue that detailing generally boosts the sales of
brand-name over generic drugs, thus driving up health care costs. Cost is a
particularly important issue for state governments, which must reimburse
for drugs prescribed to citizens covered by governmental medical plans.
“Marketing . . . increases the cost of health care by leading to
overprescribing of drugs and probably over-diagnosis of illnesses. In this
way marketing drives up health care costs, which are often not directly
borne by the patient because of public or private insurance.”44
“Markets . . . generally fail to keep [drug] prices low because of low
elasticity of demand driven by moral hazard. Because high prices are often
coupled with low production costs, drug and device companies can expand
their income by expanding their markets.”45 They largely accomplish this
41.
Jost, supra note 21, at 334.
42.
Mello & Messing, supra note 32; see also David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and
the Protection of Patients’ Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74 (2010).
43.
Jost, supra note 21, at 334.
44.
Id. (footnote omitted).
45.
Id. For a critique that excessive cost is endemic to the health care system in general, see David
A. Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like in Everything Else, 36 AM. J.L.
& MED. 370 (2010).
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through a wide variety of marketing practices like detailing, many of which
the FDA attempts (with only limited success) to regulate.
For all these reasons (and others), the states of Maine, New Hampshire,
and Vermont passed laws limiting the sales of prescription records for this
purpose.46 In all three states, IMS Health, Inc. brought lawsuits seeking to
have enforcement of the laws enjoined and the statutes struck down as
unconstitutional.47 In Maine and New Hampshire, the company lost.48 But
in Vermont the company struck pay dirt—it got a decision striking down
the Vermont law. These outcomes paved the way for IMS Health to take its
case to the Supreme Court, pointing out the circuit split as to the
constitutionality of these three, relatively similar laws.49 In Sorrell the
Supreme Court resolved that split by declaring Vermont’s statute
unconstitutional; but its reasoning was sufficiently sweeping to render all
three unconstitutional.50
II. SORRELL V. IMS HEALTH, INC.: REGULATION OF MARKETING AS
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION?

Although motivated by similar concerns for doctor and patient privacy,
health care costs, and patient safety, the statutes passed in Maine and New
Hampshire differed slightly from that of Vermont. The Maine statute
allowed for the sale of data unless the physician opted out,51 and the New
Hampshire statute banned the sale of prescribing data altogether.52 The
Vermont statute struck a position in-between these two and forbade the sale
of prescribing data unless the physician opted into the practice.53 In other
words, the Vermont statute allowed the doctor to decide whether he would
permit the sale of information about his prescription practices for this
purpose. But the default the law established that sales for marketing
purposes would be prohibited.54 William H. Sorrell, the Attorney General
46.
Mello & Messing, supra note 32.
47.
IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (Vermont); IMS Health, Inc. v. Mills, 616
F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (Maine); IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (New
Hampshire).
48.
See Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (Maine); Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (New Hampshire).
49.
As discussed more fully in the text which follows, the laws were not exactly the same. And
these differences might have made a difference to a Court interested in doing a finer-grained analysis
under the Central Hudson test discussed infra. However, the Sorrell Court painted instead with a very
broad brush and announced a standard that virtually ignored the Central Hudson test.
50.
See Mello & Messing, supra note 32, at 1252.
51.
Mills, 616 F.3d at 13.
52.
Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47.
53.
IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The statute adopts an opt-in
approach, allowing prescribers to opt in to allow the use of their PI data for marketing purposes.”).
54.
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83–87 (2008) (discussing importance of defaults).
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for the State of Vermont, confirmed that one of the purposes of the
Vermont law was to permit “doctors—not the government—to decide
whether their prescribing information may be sold and used for marketing
purposes.”55 The law was intended to give doctors control over how
information about their prescribing practices could be used with respect to
marketing efforts directed at them.
The specific language of the Vermont statute, §4631(d), was as
follows:
A health insurer, a self-insured employer, an electronic
transmission intermediary, a pharmacy, or other similar entity shall
not sell, license, or exchange for value regulated records containing
prescriber-identifiable information, nor permit the use of regulated
records containing prescriber-identifiable information for
marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber
consents. . . .56
Subsection (d) was a part of a larger statute entitled “Confidentiality of
Prescription Information” which itself was just one part of a larger
enactment, entitled “Prescription Drug Cost Containment.”57 The statute
reflected legislators’ judgment that limiting the use of prescribing
information for marketing purposes would have the effect of increasing
prescriptions of generic drugs, thereby enabling the state to hold down
reimbursement costs.58
The pharmaceutical companies, in contrast, believed obtaining this
prescribing information would boost sales of brand-name drugs, which is
why they troubled to buy the data in the first place. They have no incentive
to promote generics. When a drug’s patent expires, other companies are
free to develop generic versions of the same drug. If doctors prescribe
generics, it cuts into brand-name sales. Once a drug becomes very popular,
companies vie to develop drugs that are fairly similar to the original. These
are known as “me-too” drugs. “Me-too” drugs are re-tooled versions of
older drugs that they replace.59
As Dr. Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, has observed, “the drugs most heavily promoted are me-too

55.
Brief for Petitioner at 1, Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779).
56.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2002) (emphasis added).
57.
Id. §§ 4601–4634.
58.
Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 269, 275–79. Cf. Young, supra note 13 at 903 (“Simply put, Sorrell
involved a quintessentially economic regulatory scheme covering activity that happened to be protected
speech.”).
59.
MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES 74–76 (2005).
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drugs, like Nexium and Lipitor and Paxil.”60 Because FDA regulations do
not require that a drug company prove that a new drug is necessarily better
than an older one, only that it is “effective,” it is possible to get FDA
approval for a new drug that is pretty much like the old one.61 The chief
advantage of doing so is that while the drug is under patent the company
has exclusive rights and can sell it at a higher price. If the seller can
convince doctors to prescribe the new, patented drug rather than the older
generic form of the drug, this is of obvious financial benefit to the drug
company that manufactures it. The benefits to the patient are much less
clear.62 And the sale of more “me-too” brand name drugs where a generic
would be effective unmistakably drives up health care costs. Such increases
are bad enough in a recessionary time, but they are particularly hard to
justify where there is no accompanying increase in the effectiveness of
drugs.
The Sorrell majority in the Supreme Court saw this as a dispute over
“viewpoints”63 and declared the Vermont statute unconstitutional on the
grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment’s guarantee that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”64
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,65 asserted that the Vermont
statute “disfavor[ed] marketing, i.e., speech with a particular content,”66
and therefore it needed to be subjected to “[h]eightened judicial scrutiny.”67
According to Kennedy, a statute like Vermont’s, which treated marketing
differently than other types of speech, is not content-neutral and as such
must show that its “discrimination” on the basis of content is justified.68
Vermont could not, in the majority’s view, do this, and thus the Court
held the statute violated the First Amendment. Throughout the opinion
Justice Kennedy characterizes Vermont’s attempt to regulate the marketing
of prescription drugs as discriminatory. The opinion is replete with words
like “disfavor” or “disfavored,” “discrimination,” “unwanted,” “identity,”
“side,” “viewpoint” and “content.”69 “The law on its face,” Justice
Kennedy declared, “burdens disfavored speech by disfavored speakers.”70

60.
Id. at 133.
61.
Id. at 75.
62.
Id. at 89–91.
63.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011).
64.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65.
The majority included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor
in addition to Justice Kennedy.
66.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2656.
67.
Id. at 2657.
68.
Id. at 2667.
69.
Id. passim.
70.
Id. at 2663 (emphasis added).
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Reading the opinion one might be forgiven for thinking that this was a civil
rights case rather than an issue of regulated pharmaceutical sales practices.
This is—to say the least—a curious way to frame the issue given that
any regulation of commercial speech (and presumably “marketing” is
encompassed within the definition of commercial speech)71 could, applying
this analysis, fail the content neutrality test because it “singles out”
commercial speech for distinct treatment on the basis of its content—that
is, because it is commercial.72 But that proposition makes a hash of the
commercial speech doctrine and effectively (but not explicitly) overrules
Central Hudson.73
The available evidence suggests that when it created the commercial
speech doctrine the Court never intended to allow marketers to assert the
same freedom from governmental regulation of their sales pitches as
political protesters may assert.74 Yet that is what Sorrell establishes. The
Sorrell decision, with its antidiscrimination rhetoric, is the culmination of a
prolonged “bait-and-switch” in which First Amendment protection for
commercial speech, originally justified to protect consumers’ access to
71.
One of the persistent problems in this area is the conflation of “advertising” as synonymous
with “commercial speech.” As discussed below and in the accompanying notes, there has never been a
very good definition for what makes commercial speech “commercial” and little recognition that there
is a great deal of what might be called “commercial speech” that is not advertising and some advertising
that is not “commercial.” This shortcoming was pointed out very early on. See Steven Shiffrin, The
First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78
NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1984). However, once the focus of the doctrine moved from listeneroriented protection to content neutrality and the rationale in the political speech cases merged with that
of the commercial speech cases (as I discuss more fully below), this issue of the definition was
“solved,” albeit indirectly and without much in the way of analytical justification that directly took on
the problems raised by Professor Shiffrin. Indeed, the mantel of content neutrality allowed the Court to
side-step offering a justification for what is now (at least potentially) a threat of unconstitutionality over
a very large swath of regulation that has, heretofore, “been thought to be economic regulation of speech
that is beneath the protection of the first amendment.” Id. at 1215. Much of the remainder of this Article
is intended as a forensic examination of how the doctrine evolved in a manner that permitted this
question to be sidestepped.
72.
For a very long time, the commercial speech doctrine has been understood to represent a form
of content regulation. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, & ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 42–43 (2012) (“Commercial speech
doctrine authorizes the state to engage in content discrimination to suppress misleading information,
and it empowers the state to compel the disclosure of information.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 194 (1983) (identifying
commercial speech as one in a list of examples of content-based regulation of speech); Jeffrey M.
Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 317–19 (1995) (identifying
commercial speech as in the category of “low value” speech and subject to intermediate scrutiny).
73.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
74.
Cf., e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (anti-littering statute insufficient to permit
government to suppress persons wanting to distribute political leaflets) with Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942) (government may suppress on the grounds of an anti-littering statute, distribution of
advertising leaflets, even where a political protest was appended to them). In addition there is evidence
in the scholarly literature that few observers have thought that marketing as a category constitutes a
viewpoint. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 560 (1989)
(suggesting that commercial speech regulation is not regulation of a viewpoint).
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truthful commercial information, has become, over time, a doctrine which
considers commercial speech from the speaker’s standpoint, as if the
speaker was promoting a viewpoint rather than a product.75 However, the
Court obscures the degree to which its analysis elevates the speaker’s rights
over the listener’s and perverts the rationale of protection for commercial
speech by invoking content neutrality.
Yet it is precisely on the basis of its content—its commercial
character—that commercial speech has historically not been treated like
fully protected speech. The commercial speaker does not speak for the
“development of the mind”76 or express beliefs or opinions77—except to the
extent that “please buy my product” can be construed as a “viewpoint.” The
commercial speaker, no matter what it appears to be talking about, and in
no matter what form that communication is delivered, is always attempting
to promote a business. The seller’s viewpoint is always that its product is
superior or ought to be purchased, even when that viewpoint is
demonstrably false, as in the case of cigarettes, or highly dubious, as in the
case of “me-too” drugs.78 Even an individual who is speaking on behalf of
the commercial speaker may not actually personally believe that the
product he is promoting is the best or will perform as portrayed. He is not
required to. We understand that salespeople may sometimes engage in
puffery,79 that they may be insincere in that they do not have a personal
belief in all the claims they make, or are required to make, for a product.
It is axiomatic that much of what sellers wish to say in aid of selling a
product is of little use to the public, and a good deal of it may threaten
grave harm. So it is not surprising that when the Court created the
commercial speech doctrine and extended only limited protection to
commercial speech, it justified this limited protection on the basis of the
listeners’, not the sellers’, interests.80

75.
For the most recent example of this treatment see the D.C. Circuit’s opinion invalidating the
FDA’s graphic warning labels. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11–5332, 12–5063, 2012 WL
3632003 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2012). The majority uses very grand language asserting that the FDA’s
graphic warnings represent an “attempt to level the playing field” with respect to inducements to smoke
but that “as the Supreme Court recently reminded us” the government isn’t permitted under the First
Amendment to regulate speech simply because it finds it “too persuasive,” and it cites Sorrell. Id. at
*12.
76.
THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4–5 (1966).
77.
Id. at 5.
78.
See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 59, at 74–114.
79.
Puffery is a doctrine that seems to apply only to advertising whereby a statement, intentionally
made and intended to cause reliance and which does cause such reliance to the detriment of the buyer,
does not result in liability because the theory is that the buyer should not have believed it or relied upon
it as it was obviously exaggerated. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brakes Prods. Liab.
Litig., 966 F. Supp. 1525, 1531 (E.D. Mo. 1997), aff’d, 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999).
80.
Indeed, some observers seem to argue that at bottom most of the rationales for why we protect
freedom of expression are about protecting the interests of listeners and the meaning that they derive
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Yet the doctrine had scarcely been announced before it began a subtle
process of shape-shifting under a ceaseless and increasingly powerful
barrage of arguments that the new doctrine was inherently illegitimate and
antithetical to notions of freedom of speech because it gave commercial
speech less protection than other protected speech.81 For the past decade or
so, industry has regularly raised the First Amendment as a defense to a
number of important governmental attempts to rein in false, deceptive, or
harmful commercial speech. And it has been winning.82 But until now it
had not succeeded in doing away with the doctrine altogether and obtaining
a declaration that commercial speech is fully protected. For all practical
purposes this is what Sorrell provides.
III. “BAIT”—THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE
The commercial speech doctrine was created in 1976.83 Prior to that
date, most judges and scholars did not think that commercial speech had
from speech rather than about the speaker’s interest in speaking. See Larry Alexander, Low Value
Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989). Similarly, other commentators argue that the First
Amendment’s prohibition on government regulation of speech is (or ought to be) totally focused on the
government’s purpose (i.e. whether it intends to ban communication) and not at all on the speaker’s
communicative intents, particularly when it comes to the problems of expressive acts or the speech/act
distinction. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001).
81.
The proponents of this position cast their arguments in a way that makes every victory for
commercial or corporate speech a victory for the First Amendment, a proposition that is only true if you
agree that the First Amendment is properly extended to these categories. This can result in the feeling
you have entered into some sort of strange parallel universe when you read the output of organizations
such as the Washington Legal Foundation which describes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Sorrell as a
“sweeping, pro-First Amendment” decision. Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free
Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 129 (2011). Proponents of this
argument seem to be epistemically indifferent to whether protection for commercial and corporate
speech actually will ensure quantitatively more speech or a greater variety of viewpoints. In fact,
because of the wide disparity in resources between commercial and non-commercial speakers, as well
as the parallel intellectual property protection for some commercial speech like trade dress and brands,
there is some reason to believe that First Amendment immunity from regulation will result in
commercial and corporate speech drowning out other speakers. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism,
Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1161, 1176–77, 1182–83 (2004). Moreover, it is abundantly clear as an empirical matter that the “truth
will out” proposition is unfounded. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57
UCLA L. REV. 897, 899 (2010).
82.
See Samp, supra note 81, at 129.
83.
As noted earlier, there is actually some ambiguity about what the phrase “commercial speech
doctrine” refers to, see supra note 6, as the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Press had identified
Chrestensen as the genesis of the “commercial speech doctrine.” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973) (“The commercial-speech doctrine is traceable
to the brief opinion in Valentine v. Chrestensen . . . .”). Presumably what the Court in Pittsburgh Press
meant by this phrase was the exclusion of advertising from First Amendment coverage. See Neuborne,
supra note 6, at 438 n.3. That is not how the phrase is used today. Today that phrase is generally used to
refer to the cases from Virginia Pharmacy forward, except by those who argue that it was Valentine
itself which newly (and inappropriately) established the subordinate status of commercial speech. See,
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any First Amendment protection at all because in 1942 the Supreme Court
had rather unceremoniously rejected the idea that the First Amendment had
any application whatsoever to advertising.84 In Valentine v. Chrestensen,
the owner of a submarine docked at a wharf on the East River in New York
had sought permission to distribute a handbill advertising the opportunity
to tour the submarine for a fee.85 He was told that this handbill would
violate the city sanitation code meant to address littering but that handbills
involving informational matters or protests were not covered by this
ordinance.86
After receiving this advice Chrestensen came up with a plan to reprint
his flyers so that on one side they contained a protest against the City Dock
Department for refusing to permit him to dock his submarine at the city
pier for exhibition purposes.87 On the other side was essentially the same ad
that had been rejected before (minus information about the fee), urging the
public to come tour his submarine.88 Chrestensen attempted to distribute
the revised handbills but was restrained by the police.89 In response, he
brought an action seeking an injunction on the grounds that the ordinance
violated the Constitution.90 The trial and appellate courts agreed with him
that the ordinance was inconsistent with the First Amendment, but the
Supreme Court reversed noting that although the Constitution provided that
“the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of
communicating information and disseminating opinion” and that the states
had limited powers when it came to restraining such activities, this was not
the case with respect to commercial speech.91 “We are . . . clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising.”92 It rejected Chrestensen’s argument that the
addition of a political protest changed the handbill’s essential character as a
commercial appeal.93
And this is where the matter lay for the next couple of decades.

e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 6, at 627 (“In 1942, the Supreme Court plucked the commercial
speech doctrine out of thin air.”).
84.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
85.
Id. at 53.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id. at 54.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
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A. Harbingers of Change
By the early 1970s, the way legal scholars thought about advertising in
connection with the First Amendment was changing. A number of
prominent academics94 (and some then not so prominent law students)95
argued that the distinctions between fully protected speech and commercial
speech were difficult to sustain. In 1965, a student note in the Harvard Law
Review observed that the First Amendment was relevant to commercial
advertising because of its informational functions.96 Nevertheless, the
anonymous author concluded that “[t]he possibly desirable objectives
furthered by advertising would not seem to require its protection by the
first amendment, particularly since the primary purpose of commercial
advertising is to advance the economic welfare of business enterprises,
over which state and federal governments enjoy wide powers of
regulation.”97
Two years later, in 1967, the Harvard Law Review, in its
“Developments in the Law” section, published an enormous comment
entitled Deceptive Advertising.98 This comment argued that the distinctions
between protected non-commercial and unprotected commercial speech
rested on shaky intellectual foundations. “Commercial advertising,” its
authors99 proclaimed, “might well be called the stepchild of the first
amendment.”100 Still, those authors were not prepared to say that no
restraint on commercial speech was appropriate. And, like the earlier note,
the comment identified “information” as one of the social benefits of
advertising. Advertising, the comment observed, “serves to facilitate” the
process of matching producers and willing consumers.101 In addition, the
authors noted that advertising stimulated demand102 (an important function
94.
See Martin A. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
95.
See, e.g., Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1191
(1965); Comment, Developments in the Law, Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967).
96.
Note, supra note 95, at 1194.
97.
Id. at 1195 (emphasis added). The author of this note was concerned primarily with the
constitutional status of shareholder voting and labor disputes and mentioned commercial advertising
only by way of example. It was clear the author took for granted governmental power to regulate
commercial speech.
98.
Comment, supra note 95.
99.
According to knowledgeable sources, the “Developments” feature usually involved multiple
authors, and like all the student work in the Harvard Law Review, it is unattributed. Email from John H.
Langbein, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to Tamara Piety, author (Jan. 14, 2012, 1:13 PM) (on
file with author).
100.
Comment, supra note 95, at 1027.
101.
Id. at 1008.
102.
Id. The argument that advertising stimulates demand is somewhat controversial since the
tobacco companies (among others) have argued that advertising only stimulates brand switching, not
demand. See, e.g., JOHN E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERTISING AND
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in cases of over-production, which some say characterized the post-WWII
American economy)103 and “enriche[d] mass culture; the images and
methods used by advertisers comprise a significant source for humor,
satire, and the graphic arts.”104 Furthermore, advertising was what
supported much of broadcast television, newspapers, and magazines.105
Despite these early signs that perhaps the categorical treatment of
advertising under the First Amendment was about to undergo a major shift,
it is clear from both of these works that the authors took for granted the
proposition that the government had a legitimate role in regulating
marketing.
Indeed, the legitimacy of governmental regulation of commercial
speech was so well-settled that the great First Amendment scholar Thomas
Emerson could, in 1970, write his magisterial general theory attempting to
categorize all of the various grounds for protecting freedom of expression
and the purposes the First Amendment serves and barely touch the question
of commercial speech. Thus he wrote:
The principles governing commercial speech, and the relations
between this sector and the area of free expression, have never
been worked out. That task is not attempted here. Up to the
present, the problem of differentiating between commercial and
other communication has not in practice proved to be a serious
one.106
He was right; it had not been a serious problem before. It was about to
become one. Those student authors were onto something. The ground was
shifting under Emerson’s feet, and what had only been worth a passing

REGULATION 75 (1997) (claiming there is “no substantial effect from advertising on consumption”). On
the other hand, it strains credulity to claim that advertising has no impact on demand when advertisers,
professionals in the field, and academic sources claim advertising is essential to creating demand. See,
e.g., TERENCE A. SHIMP, ADVERTISING, PROMOTION & SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATED
MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS 18 (6th ed., 2003) (“The objective [of marketing] . . . is to move people
to action.”). Moreover, the justification for a tax deduction for advertising expenditures is that they are
“ordinary and necessary” business expenditures under the tax code. 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a) (2011). How
could they be “necessary” if it is not as generative of income? Indeed, some argue that because
advertising generates long term goodwill, which is an intangible asset, these expenditures ought to be
capitalized, not treated as a deduction (which essentially turns them into a tax credit). See Mona L.
Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 347, 414–22 (2000).
103.
I am not aware of any serious dispute about whether the end of WWII meant that American
businesses experienced a serious sudden surplus of productive capacity. The evidence suggests that the
prevailing wisdom, reflected also in the Harvard Law Review Comment above, was that advertising
was an important stimulus for consumption of this excess capacity. See, e.g., LIZABETH COHEN, A
CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POST WAR AMERICA (2003).
104.
Comment, supra note 95, at 1016.
105.
Id.
106.
EMERSON, supra note 76, at 105 n.46 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
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mention in 1970 would become, by the end of the decade, a distinct and
developed body of law based on a new theory about what the First
Amendment protects.107
B. The First Developed Theory for Protection
In 1971 Professor Martin Redish published an extended argument for
the proposition that commercial speech ought to be afforded greater First
Amendment protection than it currently enjoyed. The article was entitled
The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression.108 It is, as he would be happy to tell you,109
apparently the first sustained argument for first amendment protection for
commercial speech outside of the student pieces mentioned above.
However, like those pieces, Redish focused his argument for the protection
for commercial speech largely on the grounds of the listeners’ interests in
receiving information110 and in their concomitant interest in selfdetermination through the exercise of choices with this information and
rather less on the interests of the speaker.111
Although he acknowledged that “[a] cursory examination of current
television and periodical advertising reveals that in practice, comparatively
little commercial promotion performs . . . a purely informational
function,”112 Redish thought this was not an insurmountable obstacle to
recognizing the informational and indeed educational function of
advertising, since it was often the case that consumers needed the
extraneous entertainment aspects of advertising to know what they really
wanted.113 Some advertising he observed serves “to develop an entirely
new set of wants on the part of consumers.”114 Moreover, “entertainment
techniques frequently must be employed to effectively attract potential

107.
See Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, supra note 6.
Note the words “and Regulating” in this title. Sorrell suggests that there will be rather more protection
than regulation going forward.
108.
Redish, supra note 94.
109.
Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 553 (1997) (“Honest, I
really was the first one. . . . Five years before the Supreme Court held that commercial speech was
deserving of First Amendment protection, long before any scholarly commentator had even intimated
that commercial speech was worthy of consideration as ‘speech’ for purposes of the constitutional
guarantee, there I was, arguing that because commercial speech ‘advances [the individual] toward the
intangible goal of rational self-fulfillment,’ it was properly characterized as protected expression.”)
(footnotes omitted).
110.
Redish, supra note 94 passim.
111.
Id. passim.
112.
Id. at 433.
113.
Id. at 434.
114.
Id. at 432 (quoting A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 196 (4th ed. 1962)).
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consumers to the information conveyed.”115 “Information received in the
commercial context . . . is specifically designed to assist the individual in
the decision-making process.”116 “[W]e [should] require an open exchange
of ideas and information in the marketplace that will help the individual
govern his personal life.”117
Indeed, the entire article is an extended encomium on the pride of place
of self-fulfillment and self-determination in what he describes as “generally
accepted . . . Western thought.”118 Relying heavily on Alexander
Meiklejohn and Thomas Emerson, Redish argued that “[s]elfgovernment . . . is premised on a belief in the integrity of the individual
intellect.”119 Nevertheless, he wrote, “extensive behavioral research [shows
that] the modern individual apparently spends little time and effort
concerning himself with affairs of the political process.”120 Despite this
disjunction between aspiration and reality, Redish observed that our system
of protection for political speech commits us to trusting this often
uninformed individual with political decision-making.121 It would be
paradoxical, Redish argued, to offer less protection where the citizen’s
decision-making is arguably more keenly animated by the concerns of his
daily life—to wit, in his purchasing decisions.122
What is significant about this argument is that it is focused almost
exclusively on the listener’s interests in hearing the speech rather than on
the speaker’s interest in speaking—even as to that aspect of human
experience which might naturally seem to describe speakers’ rather than
listeners’ interests—self-fulfillment. The bulk of the article focuses on the
ways in which advertising (and other commercial speech) contributes to the

115.
Id. at 434.
116.
Id. at 445.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 438.
119.
Id. Note that this argument, by employing terms like “self-government” and “rational
faculties,” is manifestly referring to human beings who live and breathe, not to corporate persons.
120.
Id. at 440. The reference and reliance on behavioral research is interesting because there is
now a great deal more of this type of research, and not just consumer behavior, than there was in 1971.
And many observers have argued that the fruits of this research support arguments for more regulation
of advertising/marketing rather than less. For a review of the arguments with respect to just one area,
food marketing, see Pierre Chandon & Brian Wansink, Is Food Marketing Making Us Fat? A MultiDisciplinary Review, (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2011/64/MKT/ISSRC, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/sbstract=1854370; Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales:
Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2005); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420
(1999). This point is also made by a prominent behavioral economist, Dan Ariely, although he couches
it with the maximum ambiguity about just how much governmental intervention he is proposing by
referring to “public policy.” DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 238–244 (2008).
121.
Redish, supra note 94, at 440.
122.
Id. at 442–43.
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self-fulfillment of listeners. Respect for human self-fulfillment, Redish
argued, requires protection of this category of speech, which (in his view)
demonstrably contributed to that self-fulfillment.
He hardly discussed the self-fulfillment commercial speech might offer
speakers. This was apparently deliberate. Indeed, he wrote, “Since
advertising performs a significant function for its recipients, its values are
better viewed with the consumer, rather than the seller, as the frame of
reference.”123 He did not make a sustained argument for the “expressive”
interests of commercial speakers.
I do not believe this was accidental. The idea that we ought to protect
commercial speech because of the speaker’s interest in speaking would
have probably been a non-starter. Certainly it would have been far less
appealing. Consider what that argument would have looked like. Instead of
arguing that human beings’ self-expression finds one outlet in consumption
decisions, therefore the ability to receive truthful information on which to
make those decisions should be protected, the argument would have to be
that engaging in commerce is itself an expressive activity warranting First
Amendment protection. In other words, instead of the argument being,
“The consumer has a right to hear about Colgate because choosing a
toothpaste is an expressive activity” (already a somewhat dubious
proposition), it would be, “Colgate has a right to try to pitch toothpaste
because selling toothpaste is an expressive activity.” This construction
confuses expression with commerce.
While commerce and expression are obviously by no means mutually
exclusive—for instance, most artists want to sell their work, not to give it
away—it cannot be said they are identical. If they were, how would it be
possible to regulate commerce at all? It is difficult to see how you regulate
commerce if you cannot regulate commercial speech. Yet if all commerce

123.
One of the notable exceptions is his observation that “[m]uch advertising which does not
convey concrete information nevertheless represents the artistic creation of an individual, and as such
deserves recognition as first amendment speech.” Id. at 446–47. This is a curious example for a couple
of reasons. In the first place, there is no “author” credited in advertising (outside of trade publications
which attribute particular campaigns to particular ad agencies or even particular “creatives”). Second,
lack of attribution is not surprising since all advertising is work for hire in which the “artist” has no
proprietary interest. See Catherine Fisk, The Modern Author at Work on Madison Avenue, in
MODERNISM AND COPYRIGHT 173, 183–84 (Paul Saint-Amour ed., 2010) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1693973. So it is a curiosity, to say the least, to use
the artistic nature of the endeavor to justify First Amendment protection but to use copyright to deny the
“artist” the fruits of her labor. Query: whose rights are being protected in this construction? If it is really
the artist’s, then one would think these interests would similarly extend to copyright. And if they don’t,
it suggests that copyright law’s supremacy in this regard reveals advertising as principally property, not
expression. For more speaker-oriented arguments, see also Redish, supra note 94, at 461–68 and
accompanying footnotes (discussing distinguishing between speakers on the basis of their financial
interests and the specific case of tobacco regulation).
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is speech and speech cannot be regulated, it would seem that commerce
cannot be regulated.
This is true at both the institutional and the individual level. All work,
whether running a business or working as an employee, no matter how
menial, routine, or repetitive, offers the worker some opportunity to express
herself through how she performs it. But that is different from saying that
the principal reason for these activities is rooted in their expressive content.
To conclude that all work, all business constitutes expressive activity
would be wildly over-determined. It would sweep all work into the ambit
of expression.124
On its face such a construction may, among other consequences, set the
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause at odds with one another,
since the latter delegates to Congress broad powers to regulate commerce
while the former forbids Congress to make laws which encroach on
freedom of expression. Without doing a lengthy exegesis into unsolved
(and probably unsolvable) problems of proper constitutional interpretation,
suffice it to say that it seems implausible that the proper resolution to any
conflict between these two provisions would be to read Congress’ power to
regulate commerce out of the Constitution on the grounds that:
(1) The First Amendment says Congress shall make “no law”
restricting freedom of speech.
(2) “Speech” = “expression.”
(3) People express themselves through commerce.
(4) Therefore commerce = expressive activity which Congress may
not regulate.
The resolution of this conflict more consistent with our past
understanding of the First Amendment is:
(1) Congress may regulate commerce.
(2) Commercial speech is a part of “commerce.”
(3) Therefore, commercial speech is a part of commerce which
may be regulated as a matter of power under the Commerce
Clause, the First Amendment notwithstanding.
Even if one concludes that the First Amendment, because it is an
amendment, somehow trumps the Commerce Clause, a reading as broad as

124.
Although I disagree with some of his analysis and conclusions therein, Professor Jed
Rubenfeld offers a powerful refutation of the proposition that all conduct is expressive for purposes of
the First Amendment. Rubenfeld, supra note 80 passim.

PIETY 1 - 54 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/19/2012 11:27 AM

“A Necessary Cost of Freedom”?

25

the first would seem to seriously undermine Congress’ power to regulate
commerce.125
It is easy to see though how framing the interests at stake as those of
the listener presents both a limiting and an equalizing element into the
proposition that commercial speech ought to be protected. Listeners are set
against big government that would paternalistically keep them ignorant.
And there is nothing about empowering consumers with information that
suggests a corollary right on the part of the speaker to be free of
government regulation. Framed this way it is easy to understand the appeal
of the listeners’-rights argument and why the Court was persuaded to
conclude that some commercial speech deserved First Amendment
protection.
Although not everyone was persuaded by this argument—some
prominent scholars vigorously objected that the First Amendment had no
place for commercial speech126—the majority of the legal community
appeared to embrace, if somewhat more reservedly than Redish himself,
the proposition that consumers ought to enjoy some First Amendment right
to receive information. And even before the Supreme Court created the
commercial speech doctrine, a few scholars seemed prepared to agree that
commercial speech ought to receive some protection,127 although even
supporters were not prepared to say that it ought to enjoy full First
Amendment protection.128
IV. THE COURT TAKES THE BAIT
A. Nibbling Around the Edges
We should not be surprised that those Harvard Law students focused
on advertising and its regulation in the late sixties. Advertising had become

125.
Although the Commerce Clause deals with federal supremacy to regulate interstate commerce
and not all commerce generally, in practice, at least in modern times, states’ attempts to regulate
commercial practices tend, as in Virginia Pharmacy itself, to be read as implicating interstate commerce
and are thus subject to federal preemption. And of course the First Amendment’s provisions apply to
the states as well through the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the argument in the text collapses what
might be some more subtle distinctions in specific circumstances.
126.
Victor A. Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422 (1980); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 6. See also Richard M. Alderman,
Commercial Entities’ Noncommercial Speech: A Contradiction in Terms, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 731,
731–32 n.4 (1982) (extensive survey of the literature following the Virginia Pharmacy decision
including these as well as other articles).
127.
See, e.g., Kenneth L Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
128.
See Alderman, supra note 126 (discussing reaction to Virginia Pharmacy). Note that the
Alderman article seems to have been among the first to link the commercial and corporate speech cases.
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a significant driver of cultural content, and a handful of important cases
had, at least nominally, involved advertising. In New York Times v.
Sullivan129 the defendants, who had taken out an ad in the New York Times
in support of Dr. Martin Luther King and the civil rights marchers in the
South, were sued for libel and defamation over factual inaccuracies in the
ad. The advertisement was what is known in the advertising business as an
“issue ad.”130 Issue ads are ad spaces purchased to promote social or
political causes. The Court found for the defendants and created a new
standard for libel and defamation cases involving public figures and issues
of public concern. Henceforth, plaintiffs would need to show that the
defendants’ misstatements were not just erroneous, but that they were made
with “actual malice.” That the statements were contained in an ad was not
the focus of the opinion, and the Court observed that the mere fact that
money was paid to run the ad did not make it “commercial” (and hence
subject to the “no First Amendment protection at all” standard under
Chrestensen).131
A few years later, the Court heard a case involving a challenge to the
practice of dividing the help-wanted ads into categories like “Jobs-Male
Interest” and “Jobs-Female Interest.”132 The National Organization for
Women had filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations against the Pittsburgh Press complaining that this practice was in
conflict with a Pittsburgh city ordinance forbidding discrimination on the
basis of sex.133 The Commission held a hearing and enjoined the practice,
and the Pittsburgh Press appealed.134 When the case came before the
Supreme Court, the Court supported the Commission and ruled that the city
ordinance did not violate the First Amendment.135 It nominally upheld the
principle announced in Chrestensen, but it also observed that New York
Times v. Sullivan had made clear that “speech is not rendered commercial
by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement.”136

129.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
130.
SHIMP, supra note 102, at 286. Shimp actually just describes issue advertising in the context
of corporate issue advertising, but because the ad in Sullivan was paid for by plaintiffs, it fit the
definition of advertising even though it was not “commercial.” Shimp defines “advertising” as “[a] form
of either mass communication or direct-to-consumer communication that is non-personal and is paid for
by various business firms, nonprofit organizations, and individuals who are in some way identified in
the advertising message and who hope to inform or persuade members of a particular audience.” Id. at
621.
131.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.
132.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
133.
Id. at 376–79.
134.
Id. at 380–81.
135.
Id. at 391.
136.
Id. at 384. Some date the development of First Amendment protection to commercial speech
from this case. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 437 n.2.
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Two years later in a third case, Bigelow v. Virginia,137 the Court was
confronted with a challenge to a Virginia law which made it illegal to
advertise the availability of abortions. Abortions were illegal in Virginia,
but the ad announced that abortions were legal in New York, that there was
no residency requirement, that all inquiries would be “strictly confidential,”
and that counseling and other information about the termination of
unwanted pregnancies was available at the location and number
provided.138 The prohibition on the advertising was premised on the state’s
power to restrict the promotion of abortion services given that abortion was
illegal in the state. The State of Virginia had prosecuted the publisher of a
newspaper under a criminal statute making it a misdemeanor to “encourage
or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage.”139
The Court struck down the law.140 In so doing, it expressly limited the
holding in Chrestensen observing that “[t]he fact that the particular
advertisement in appellant’s newspaper had commercial aspects or
reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First
Amendment guarantees.”141 Chrestensen’s holding, the majority wrote, “is
distinctly a limited one” relating to “the manner in which commercial
advertising could be distributed.”142 “The case obviously does not support
any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.”143
This proposition was not obvious at all to the dissenting Justices. In a
dissent written by Justice Rehnquist, in which Justice White concurred,
Rehnquist argued that, contrary to the majority’s interpretation,
Chrestensen had heretofore stood for the proposition that the exclusion of
commercial speech from First Amendment protection was, if not total, at
least broad enough to encompass regulation of the sort Virginia sought to
enforce.144 The majority, Rehnquist wrote, did not “confront head-on the
question which” the case posed but instead made “contact with it only in a
series of verbal sideswipes.”145
Because the Bigelow decision came so closely on the heels of the
Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wade,146 it was initially unclear to
observers whether the decision rested on the content of the ad, that is,
whether it was the fact that the ad was for abortion services that justified

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Id. at 812.
Id. at 812–13.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 820 (emphasis added).
Id. at 830–32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 829–30.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the decision or whether it reflected a more general turn to offer greater
protection for commercial speech. The former proposition seemed likely to
some, but this interpretation would seem to violate the precept that First
Amendment protection should not vary on the basis of content. As the
dissent noted, “we have always refused to distinguish for First Amendment
purposes on the basis of content . . . .”147
Yet, the majority opinion explicitly stated: “We need not decide in this
case the precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of
advertising that is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or
even prohibit.”148 Like Bigelow, both the New York Times v. Sullivan and
the Pittsburgh Press cases clearly involved civil rights issues that had
economic aspects and so were also not clearly just commercial.
B. Hooked: The Commercial Speech Doctrine Born
All doubts about whether Bigelow signaled more expansive protection
for commercial speech were dispelled a year later with the decision that is
often credited for creating the commercial speech doctrine, one that
ironically also involved pharmacies and prescription drugs—Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Citizens Council, Inc.
[hereinafter Virginia Pharmacy].149 There, a consumers’ group challenged
a Virginia law that prohibited pharmacies from engaging in price
advertising.150 The State defended the law on the grounds that permitting
price advertising might lead pharmacies to engage in price wars that could
decrease pharmacies’ profit margins, possibly leading them to cut back on
services to consumers.151 Since accurate and complete information about
prescription drugs could have an obvious impact on public health, the State
argued that good service, for example, in the form of individualized
attention from pharmacists, was of sufficient importance to warrant
suppression of price advertising.152
The Court disagreed. Instead it found that, “[a]s to the particular
consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information, that
interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s
most urgent political debate.”153 And it unequivocally announced that
commercial speech enjoyed First Amendment protection.154 This
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 825 (majority opinion).
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 753–54.
Id. at 767–68.
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 770.
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announcement tracked, almost to the letter, the recommendations made five
years earlier by Professor Redish. However, as in that early Redish article,
the Supreme Court spent almost none of its discussion justifying this new
protection for commercial speech on the basis of the speaker’s interests.
Instead, the Court focused almost exclusively155 on the benefits of freedom
for truthful commercial speech for the listeners.
This focus on the consumer’s interest highlighted a curious aspect of
the case. The case was brought by consumers, not pharmacists, and thus did
not engage with the question of the speakers’ interests.156 Therefore, there
was a serious question as to whether the consumer group had standing to
challenge the statute since the Virginia law did not prohibit consumers
from publishing information about prescription drug prices, just
pharmacies.157 Indeed, a good deal of the opinion is given over to
discussing this standing issue and then analyzing the question from the
perspective of the listeners.
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be

155.
The Court actually assumed away the very question that might be said to have been before
it—whether commercial speakers have a First Amendment right to speak—since the Court assumes,
without offering any rationale, that “of course” speakers have these rights, and if speakers do, so must
listeners. That “of course” does not necessarily reflect that speakers’ rights have precedence over
listeners, rather only that the concept of listeners possessing cognizable First Amendment rights was a
somewhat more novel and perhaps controversial proposition at the time. This sleight of hand was
assisted by the fact that it was the consumers who were bringing the suit, and thus, there was a standing
problem. As the Court noted, the earlier precedent did not unequivocally establish protection for
commercial speech. Indeed, Chrestensen did the opposite. But in order to get to the listeners, the Court
apparently seemed to believe it had to find a right for speakers. It did so not by analysis or exploration
of the arguments for and against protecting commercial speech on behalf of speakers, but simply by
fiat, announcing it had found such a right even though, arguably, the existence of such a right was
precisely the question before the Court. The remainder of the opinion is devoted to outlining why
listeners might have a protectable First Amendment right as well, and the entire argument for justifying
protection for commercial speech is written from the perspective of the listeners. For an early
discussion of this aspect of the case, see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 6, at 6, 16–17, 25. Of particular
note is the authors’ observation that the listeners’ interest in hearing price advertising constituted “[a]
more potent consideration” than that of the pharmacists to advertise. Id. at 25.
156.
See Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist’s
Recollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004).
157.
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable.158
These were the Court’s justifications for offering expanded protection
to commercial speech: the consumer’s interest in commercial information;
the notion that consumer decisions might be more personal, more relevant
to their self-fulfillment in their everyday lives than political speech; the
relentless focus on the listeners’ interests and the proposal that listeners had
cognizable rights under the First Amendment to receive information as
much as speakers had to speak; and the proposition that good decisions
were related to good information, and since advertising provided at least
some information, it therefore aided good decision-making and could be
said to supply a public benefit.159 All these arguments were raised by
Redish in his 1971 article.160
There was, however, at least one critical difference between the
arguments set forth by the Court and those offered by Redish. Although
Redish had acknowledged in passing, without much elaboration, that his
proposal would not eliminate the government’s ability to regulate false
commercial speech,161 the Court in Virginia Pharmacy, perhaps because it
was moving out of the realm of theory and into the creation of actual law,
was at some pains to make clear how governmental regulation of
commercial speech could essentially continue, if not as before, certainly
without losing anything essential. In footnote 24 the Court noted:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment
protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from
other forms. There are commonsense differences between speech
that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction,” . . . and other varieties. Even if the differences do not
justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus
subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless
suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure
that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be
more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news
reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser
seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or
service that he himself provides and presumably knows more about

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 765 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
Id. at 763–69.
Redish, supra note 94.
Id. at 462.
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than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be more durable
than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of
commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by
proper regulation and forgone entirely.
Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of
commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker. . . . They
may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial message
appear in such a form, or include such additional information,
warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being
deceptive. . . . They may also make inapplicable the prohibition
against prior restraints.162
Footnote 24 makes unequivocal at least two points relevant to the
Court’s most recent decision in Sorrell: first, that as conceived, the
protection that the Court was extending in Virginia Pharmacy was more
limited than that given to fully protected speech163 and would require a
content-based inquiry into whether speech was commercial before applying
this new intermediate level of scrutiny; and second, that this intermediate
level of scrutiny was not merely permissible, it was “necessary.” The
Sorrell Court’s content-neutrality analysis is completely at odds with both
of these limiting principles.
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent to the Virginia Pharmacy majority
opinion. He thought this decision, “which elevates commercial intercourse
between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain

162.
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
163.
In yet more evidence that the Supreme Court is making stealthy inroads on Virginia
Pharmacy there was a curious citation to it in the 2012 decision in the “Stolen Valor” case. United
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). In Alvarez the Court struck down a statute which made it a
crime to lie about being a Medal of Honor recipient on the grounds that the statute regulated content
and thus was subject to a strict scrutiny review which it did not survive. Brushing aside previous case
law in which the Court had suggested that false speech had no First Amendment value, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, observed that the First Amendment must sometimes protect some
false speech, citing Sullivan. Id. at 2545. Just before that observation he reviewed the precedent which
described the various categories of speech which had traditionally constituted exceptions to the content
neutrality requirement. Id. at 2544–45. In a string cite of these cases which included the usual
references to “fighting words” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)) and “obscenity”
(New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S 747 (1982)), among others, Justice Kennedy offers the following
category: “fraud, see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) . . . .” Id. at 2544. In the past, the words “commercial speech” would have appeared
where Justice Kennedy put the word “fraud.” Thus, with a few keystrokes the holding in Virginia
Pharmacy is reduced to the proposition that the government may regulate fraud. This is manifestly not
the case. What was distinctive about Virginia Pharmacy was that it established some limited First
Amendment protection for truthful commercial speech while reaffirming the government’s authority to
regulate even truthful speech if it met the intermediate scrutiny test. A commercial speech doctrine
reduced to the proposition that the First Amendment does not protect fraud is one that is vanishingly
small if it exists at all.
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to the same plane as has been previously reserved for the free marketplace
of ideas,”164 was likely to have “far reaching” consequences that the
majority did not, perhaps, sufficiently appreciate.165 Moreover, he was not
persuaded by the argument that the public interest in information in a free
market necessarily meant this interest was of a constitutional dimension:
While there is again much to be said for the Court’s observation
[about the preservation of a properly functioning free market] as a
matter of desirable public policy, there is certainly nothing in the
United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature
to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions
regulating the pharmacy profession.166
In Justice Rehnquist’s view, the argument that the First Amendment
protected the right to receive information as well as to disseminate it was
related to protection for political, social, and artistic expression and matters
of public concern, not purely private ones. “It is undoubtedly arguable that
many people in the country regard the choice of shampoo as just as
important as who may be elected to local, state, or national political office,
but that does not automatically bring information about competing
shampoos within the protection of the First Amendment.”167 He predicted
that the Court’s new interpretation would be difficult to cabin and might
well be used to challenge the laws regulating the professions, the sale of
securities, cigarettes, alcohol, and other products the promotion of which,
like prescription drugs, the government had legitimate interests in
regulating.168
Rehnquist’s concerns would prove him prescient, but it would take
some time for the seeds planted by Virginia Pharmacy to give rise to
Citizens United and, ultimately, to Sorrell.
C. The Central Hudson Test
Four years after the Virginia Pharmacy decision, the Court elaborated
on the contours of its newly created doctrine by articulating a test that the
Court said applied to regulations of commercial speech. In Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,169 the
utility company challenged the constitutionality of a regulation that
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
Id. at 787 (emphasis added).
Id. at 789.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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prohibited promotional advertising by the utility. New York sought to
decrease consumption of electricity in the interest of energy
conservation.170 The utility objected that the prohibition violated its
constitutional rights.171 In this case, unlike in Virginia Pharmacy, it was the
speaker who was raising the challenge. And, once again, the Court struck
down the regulation in question, but this time it did so while providing a
more detailed template for analyzing future commercial speech cases.
In order for a questioned regulation to survive a First Amendment
challenge under the commercial speech doctrine the Court said four
elements of the regulation must be assessed.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.172
Once again, the decision was not unanimous. As before, Justice
Rehnquist felt the majority had been insufficiently deferential to legitimate
state interests. Although he conceded that Virginia Pharmacy was now the
law and was prepared to accept the new test the Court had devised in
Central Hudson, he disagreed with its application of that test to the facts in
this case.173 In declining to give more deference to the Commission’s
determination of how to best address its energy conservation goals, Justice
Rehnquist believed the majority had revived the discredited Lochner-era
approach to economic regulation.174 And he reiterated his view that in
creating the commercial speech doctrine, the Court had opened a
“Pandora’s box.”175
This time, however, Rehnquist was not alone in disagreeing with the
majority; except that far from thinking the Court had been too generous in
granting First Amendment status to this speech, these other Justices argued

170.
Id. at 559.
171.
Id. at 560.
172.
Id. at 566.
173.
Id. at 583 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174.
Id. at 589.
175.
Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This concern was also raised by two of Virginia
Pharmacy’s most trenchant critics, Professors Jackson and Jeffries. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note
6, at 30–31 (“In short, the Supreme Court has reconstituted the values of Lochner v. New York as
components of freedom of speech.”).
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that the majority had not been generous enough and should have applied a
stricter standard. Justices Brennan and Stevens thought that the line
between commercial and non-commercial speech presented in the case was
blurrier than the majority suggested, and they argued that perhaps this
should not have been a commercial speech case at all.176 Justice Blackmun
wrote that the Public Service Commission’s regulation was “a covert
attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by
persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of the
information needed to make a free choice.”177
Once again we see this trope of concern for decision-makers having the
information they need to make decisions even if one is hard-pressed to
identify the informational aspects of commercial propaganda.178 Rather
than probe this question, the Court seemed content to work with a very
loose definition of “information.”179 So even though the claim was raised
by the commercial speaker, the arguments in favor of protecting the speech
continued to focus on the ways in which freedom for the speaker meant—
as the majority saw it—freedom for the listener as well.
176.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 572–73 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 579
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
177.
Id. at 574–75 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
178.
I use the word “propaganda” because I mean to encompass far more than mere advertising in
referring to commercial persuasion. This is in contrast to the proposition that the term “commercial
speech” is synonymous with the term “advertising.” Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 6, at 1 (equating
commercial speech with “business advertising”). And although in common parlance the word
“propaganda” is often used as if it invariably entails untrue or unfair methods, I don’t think that is
accurate. The term may be properly used any time one is referring to attempts to persuade versus
attempts to inform. See EDWARD BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA (1928). Of course there isn’t a neat or easy
division between information and persuasion, and most communication may have a persuasive element.
What distinguishes commercial speech and (to my mind at least) warrants the label “propaganda” is
that, for a commercial firm touting itself or its wares, there is no internal norm or public expectation
that what is issued from the commercial firm is to be unbiased or complete. It is expected that the seller
of a product will say only positive things about that product. This is not the case with scholarship,
journalism, and judicial opinions, to offer only a few examples. How the norms of the marketplace have
so suffused all communication such that we tend to think it normal for journalists to have a “slant,”
government to be “an interest group,” and the very existence of impartial sources to be distrusted is
sufficiently complicated a topic as to warrant a separate article or book on its own, and so, I cannot
adequately explore it here. There is undoubtedly no completely unbiased form of communication. This
is not to say, however, that there is no difference between those forms of communication that have at
least pretensions to objectivity and those which are not even nominally bound by such pretensions.
Marketing in its various forms, including public relations, is not, I submit, even nominally bound by the
sorts of internal norms that supposedly bind attorneys as zealous advocates, for example, to
acknowledge and distinguish contrary authority. Instead, it is unequivocally one-sided. That, I think,
makes the term propaganda warranted.
179.
It turns out that industry has very asymmetrical notions of what constitutes “information.”
Although their own promotional speech is justified as “information,” in the case attacking the FDA’s
graphic warning labels, the tobacco companies successfully argued these graphic pictures are meant as
persuasion, not as information intended to support informed choice and therefore the rule requiring the
companies to carry these “messages” was unconstitutional. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. vs. U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, Nos. 11–5332, 12–5063, 2012 WL 3632003
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2012).
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There was little discussion of the expressive interests of the speaker,
and this is no surprise. The usual speaker-oriented arguments for protecting
freedom of expression, which rely on notions of the importance of
autonomy, of the importance of using and developing one’s rational
faculties, and of the importance of self-determination, have little or no
resonance with respect to a corporation. A corporation is a legal fiction, not
a living thing. It does not, itself, have such needs. As one observer put it:
The barely intelligible idea that corporations could have
independent rights of their own, apart from the interests of affected
persons, might be suggested by judicial decisions establishing that
corporations are persons for various legal purposes. But this
manner of speaking does not mean that corporations have feelings,
interests in self-expression, or other characteristics of human
beings that make them persons.180
Central Hudson became a key marker in the development of the
doctrine. From that time to this, Central Hudson has remained the
controlling test for assessing challenged regulations of commercial speech.
At the time it was announced, and for several years afterwards, it appeared
to genuinely constitute an intermediate scrutiny test—that is to say, from
time to time some governmental regulations would survive review.181 Over
time, the test has been applied in a manner closer to strict scrutiny.182
However, even as the Court became increasingly skeptical of governmental
regulations of commercial speech, preservation of the Central Hudson
framework reinforced the notion that the regulation of commercial speech
was subject to a distinct and at least nominally less rigorous level of
scrutiny than that of other protected speech—a proposition which is at
some odds with the Sorrell Court’s content-neutrality analysis. Yet, a

180.
Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-Commercial
Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 398–99 (2006). Similar objections are raised in conjunction with the
Citizens United decision. See, e.g., Robert Weissman, Let the People Speak: The Case for a
Constitutional Amendment to Remove Corporate Speech from the Ambit of the First Amendment, 83
TEMP. L. REV. 979 (2011).
181.
Another way of describing the standard was that the Court had characterized commercial
speech as “low value” speech and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny or balancing instead of speech
designated as “high value.” See Stone, supra note 72, at 194–97; Sunstein, supra note 74. For critiques
of the high value/low value distinction, see Alexander, supra note 80; Steven G. Gey, The First
Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2008).
182.
Vladeck, supra note 6 at 1055–59. Even before Sorrell it seemed fair to say that, as a
practical matter, the Central Hudson test was intrinsically flawed since prongs (3) and (4) of the test are
in tension with one another. Regulation that is effective under prong (3) is likely to be deemed
overbroad under prong (4). On the other hand, if regulators attempt to create a law with narrow
application to avoid prong (4), there is a substantial likelihood that it will not survive the prong (3) test
for effectiveness.
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persistent problem has been uncertainty about what made speech
“commercial.”
D. The Content Problem: What Makes Speech “Commercial”?
The Central Hudson test starts out with a problem. And it is a content
problem. The first prong under the test is whether the speech “concern[s]
lawful activity” and is not misleading.183 This is a requirement for the
doctrine to apply. Thus, untruthful or misleading commercial speech is not
protected at all, nor is commercial speech about a product that is illegal.
However, the fact that speech is truthful does not make it “commercial.”
And it could not be the case that speech concerning an unlawful activity,
for example arguments to legalize marijuana use, would be prohibited by
the First Amendment. So there must be some quality by which courts
identify and distinguish commercial from non-commercial speech: a
distinction that is obviously content-based. Yet, in establishing the
doctrine, the Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy did not provide a very
clear definition of what made speech “commercial,” and subsequent
decisions did not prove much more illuminating.184
The Virginia Pharmacy majority thought there were “commonsense”
differences, but it did not elaborate on what those differences might be. Yet
the difference is (was) critical.185 As noted above, very early into the
development of the new commercial speech doctrine, Professor Steven
Shiffrin observed that there was a serious definitional problem.
Each commercial speech case the Court has considered has
involved advertising or the proposal of a commercial transaction,
and almost all of the commentators have looked at the “commercial
speech” problem through the lens of commercial advertising. The
collective myopia has distorted something quite important: the
commercial speech that has been beneath the protection of the first

183.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
184.
The Court has said that government may “distinguish between the relative value of different
categories of commercial speech” when such distinctions would not be permissible as to
noncommercial speech, thereby suggesting that content neutrality is not as important in commercial
speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514 (1981). See also Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68 (1976) (“We have also made it clear . . . that the content of a particular
advertisement may determine the extent of its protection.”).
185.
For a discussion of the importance of definition, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk,
What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143
(2004); James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism:
Lessons From Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091 (2004); Nat Stern, In Defense of the
Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 83–87 (1999) (summarizing critiques).

PIETY 1 - 54 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/19/2012 11:27 AM

“A Necessary Cost of Freedom”?

37

amendment for all these years has not been confined to commercial
advertising.186
Indeed, he wrote, advertising and, more generally, speech that proposes
a commercial transaction is “only the tip of the iceberg.”187 That iceberg
contains a very large body of law regulating what companies can say to
their shareholders, what issuers of securities can say to the public, and what
employers can say to their employees in the face of union organizing
activities, antitrust laws, laws regulating lobbying, and a “host of
government regulations.”188
The definition the Supreme Court offered for commercial speech in
Virginia Pharmacy was one it had previously floated in the Pittsburgh
Press case: “speech that does ‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction.’”189 That definition was extremely narrow and was later
supplemented (although subsequent commentators sometimes neglect to
mention this) in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.190 In Bolger, the
Court expanded the definition to cover materials that did more than merely
propose a commercial transaction. Bolger involved a pamphlet that
discussed the role of condoms in preventing sexually transmitted diseases.
The pamphlet mixed promotional material with a discussion of a matter of
public concern.
This was the tactic that the plaintiff in Valentine v. Chrestensen had
used to no effect when trying to insulate his flyers from treatment as mere
advertising. Of course, in light of Virginia Pharmacy, even purely
commercial speech would not be deprived of all protection because of its
commercial character. But, it remained to be seen whether, after Virginia
Pharmacy, the inclusion of some discussion of a matter of public concern
would deprive the speech of its commercial character and, thus, entitle it to
enhanced protection under a strict scrutiny standard, or whether even the
inclusion of some non-promotional material would fail to completely
overshadow its commercial character such that the intermediate scrutiny
standard would still apply.
The Bolger Court opted for the latter approach: “Because the degree of
protection afforded by the First Amendment depends on whether the
activity sought to be regulated constitutes commercial or noncommercial
speech, we must first determine the proper classification of the mailings at
186.
Shiffrin, supra note 71, at 1213 (footnotes omitted).
187.
Id. at 1214.
188.
Id. at 1214–15.
189.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)).
190.
463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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issue here.”191 It noted, citing New York Times v. Sullivan, that although the
fact that the pamphlet was (1) concededly an advertisement, that fact would
not be enough to render it commercial speech.192 However, the combination
of that fact along with (2) a reference to a product and (3) an economic
motivation on the part of the speaker could support a finding that the
pamphlet was properly categorized as commercial speech.193
So, although the Court ultimately held that the brochure in question
was protected speech, it came to that conclusion only after it had defined
the speech as “commercial” and then applied the Central Hudson
intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech.194 It did not apply the
strict scrutiny test that would have been applicable if the brochure was fully
protected speech under the First Amendment. Indeed, the entire exercise of
parsing the brochure to determine what sort of speech it contained would
have been nonsensical if the Court thought that content was irrelevant.
Around 1993, the Supreme Court began interpreting the Central
Hudson test more rigorously, and the notion of content-neutrality made its
first appearance in a doctrine that, by definition, presupposed the propriety
of a content-based distinction between commercial and noncommercial
protected speech. The case was City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc.195 There, the Court struck down an attempt to regulate the presence of
news racks containing commercial flyers differently than those containing
traditional newspapers.196 Here, perhaps, is the first intimation that singling
out commercial speech for different treatment on the basis of its
commercial content might run afoul of the First Amendment—even though
the doctrine is predicated on such a distinction.
Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that its holding was “narrow.”197
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted, “we do not reach the
question whether, given certain facts and under certain circumstances, a
community might be able to justify differential treatment of commercial
and noncommercial newsracks.”198 Rather, the Court held that:
[i]n the absence of some basis for distinguishing between
“newspapers” and “commercial handbills” that is relevant to an
interest asserted by the city, we are unwilling to recognize
Cincinnati’s bare assertion that the “low value” of commercial
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 66–75.
507 U.S. 410 (1993).
Id. at 430–31.
Id. at 428.
Id.
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speech is a sufficient justification for its selective and categorical
ban on newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills.”199
The
Discovery
Network
opinion
asserted
that
the
commercial/noncommercial distinction bore “no relationship whatsoever to
the particular interests that the city has asserted.”200
Although Discovery Network appears to have introduced this contentneutrality concept into the commercial speech context, it was in a more
modest form than that adopted in Sorrell. Content neutrality is brought in at
the end of the analysis after applying the Central Hudson test. Indeed,
Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion because he wished to urge
the Court to dispense with Central Hudson on the grounds that it offered
“insufficient protection for truthful, noncoercive commercial speech
concerning lawful activities.”201
In contrast, in Sorrell, content neutrality is the first and most critical
inquiry, with Central Hudson bringing up the rear. And Vermont had
offered far more than a “bare assertion” that data mining for marketing
purposes was “low value.” Its reasons for enacting the law had a
demonstrable connection between the law and the state’s interest in
reducing health care costs by encouraging the prescribing of generic drugs.
We know that because the sellers’ eagerness for the data arose directly
from its connection to the successful promotion of brand name drugs. So
how did we get from the Discovery Network’s conception of contentneutrality to Sorrell’s?
The answer is hinted at in the references to commercial speech as “low
value” speech that litter the opinions of the majority and concurring
opinions. The implication is that designating something as “low value” is
offensive in some way, particularly when the listeners may find it valuable.
There is a studied disapproval of what sounds like discriminatory or
paternalistic judgments with respect to what constitutes high versus low
value speech. This disapproval is the content-focused aspect that can be
referred to as “the equality principle” in the First Amendment
jurisprudence.
That equality principle had its roots in a completely different context—
the Civil Rights Movement. But, its importation into the commercial and
corporate speech contexts was to have far-reaching consequences. It would
represent the “switch” in the focus of the commercial speech doctrine.
From the moment it was introduced, it began to pave the way for an
increasingly robust right for commercial speakers, one that would
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 443.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 431 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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subordinate the interests of the listeners, which had justified the doctrine in
the first place, and would mean that, when challenged, the government
would have to overcome increasingly high hurdles to justify regulation of
marketing.
V. “SWITCH”: THE SHIFT TO THE SPEAKER
Five years after Redish published his seminal article, the Court
announced the commercial speech doctrine, and as the 20th century
advanced, what might be called the “commercial equality” position picked
up legitimacy and steam.202 By the early 1990s, there was a noticeable
uptick in the publication of articles in law reviews that argued for greater,
or even full, First Amendment protection for commercial speech or
corporate speech.203 This was matched by an increase in hostility in the
Supreme Court toward governmental attempts to regulate commercial
speech. And, in both areas, the rhetoric shifted away from
consumer/listener-oriented arguments and toward content–discrimination
202.
Interestingly, what was most noticeable early on was that those who would have typically
been identified as “liberal” or “progressive” were no longer as willing to treat the First Amendment or
rights language as sacred cows. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375 (1990). Professor Balkin presciently observed
that “conservative forces soon will overtake and appropriate the libertarian approach to first amendment
law that progressives have used so effectively in the past.” Id. at 386.
203.
The argument has been forcefully made that all expression by a commercial entity is, by
definition, “commercial speech.” See Bennigson, supra note 180. The list of articles arguing for
expanded protection for commercial speech includes Redish’s 1971 article, supra note 94, as well as the
following articles (although this is by no means an exhaustive list): Developments in the Law—
Corporations and Society, Free Speech Protections for Corporations: Competing in the Markets of
Commerce and Ideas, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2004); Kozinski & Banner, supra note 6; Charles H.
Moellenberg & Leon F. DeJulius, Jr., Second Class Speakers: A Proposal to Free Protected Corporate
Speech from Tort Liability, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 555 (2009); Neuborne, supra note 6; Larry E. Ribstein,
Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109 (1992); Rodney A. Smolla, Information,
Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 777 (1993); Symposium, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, Remarks by Michael
Gartner, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1173 (1988); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16
YALE J. ON REG. 85 (1999).
Interestingly, many of the articles supporting this viewpoint were written by attorneys in private practice,
some of whom focus their practices on precisely these issues. While there is nothing particularly sinister
about that, it raises another issue—the distortion in the “marketplace of ideas” that may arise from an
imbalance of resources and incentives where some have both the means and a keen financial interest in
shaping the law. One way to do that (or attempt to do it) is to “seed” the academic literature. See, e.g.,
Shireen A. Barday, Notes, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61
STAN. L. REV. 711 (2008); Lee Epstein & Charles E. Clarke, Jr., Academic Integrity and Legal
Scholarship in the Wake of Exxon Shipping, Footnote 17, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33 (2010);
Thomas O. McGarity, A Movement, a Lawsuit, and the Integrity of Sponsored Law and Economics
Research, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 51 (2010). Because in the past there was no well-developed norm
about financial disclosures, law reviews may be particularly vulnerable to being used this way. For a
discussion of how the the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor obscures important differences between the
search for truth and Pareto optimality in the market for goods and services, see Alvin I. Goldman &
James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1996).
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arguments for protecting commercial speech. Tellingly, little rhetorical
firepower was expended to make arguments grounded on a strong
speaker’s rights theory for the speaker’s right, as a speaker, to “express”
himself. Even this newer focus on content owed much of its persuasiveness
to arguments about the social benefits of hearing all views expressed.
A. The Equality Principle in Freedom of Expression
As everyone knows, the 50s and 60s, the period that preceded Virginia
Pharmacy, saw the momentous changes wrought by the Civil Rights
Movement. It was a dramatic time. America was also embroiled in a war in
Vietnam, and a vigorous movement had arisen to protest it. The Women’s
Rights Movement was beginning (once again) to make its political
influence felt, this time not merely on the issue of suffrage for women but
on issues of reproductive freedom, equal pay, and freedom from sexual
coercion and harassment. And again, in the course of both of these
movements, lives were lost (Kent State) and protestors often experienced
violence from the opposition or official violence in the form of arrest. The
social and legal consequences of these movements for equal justice were
vivid and salient in the mid-70s.
Then, as now, many people associated the First Amendment with these
movements and protests. Civil rights and the First Amendment went
together. The Civil Rights Movement gave rise to several important First
Amendment cases in which civil liberties claims intertwined with economic
claims (such as jobs listings in the classified ads) or commercial means of
distribution (newspaper advertising). In many instances, arguments for
equal protection under the law seemed to merge seamlessly into arguments
for protecting freedom of speech. Scholars argued that the First
Amendment encompassed equal protection or “equal liberty” to speak.204
This work, and the cases which adopted this framework, would provide the
rhetorical framework at the heart of the reasoning in Sorrell. One of the
most eloquent advocates of this equal liberty argument was Professor
Kenneth Karst.205
Professor Kenneth Karst and others argued that the First Amendment
necessarily contained an equal protection justification: that the principle of
protection for freedom of expression must have at its core the notion that
freedom of speech was only achieved if that freedom was shared by all.206
“The principle of equality, when understood to mean equal liberty, is not

204.
205.
206.

See infra note 205.
Karst, supra note 127, at 21.
Id.
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just a peripheral support for the freedom of expression, but rather part of
the ‘central meaning of the First Amendment,’”207 Karst wrote.
Like Professor Redish before him, Professor Karst constructed an
impassioned argument for this equal liberty proposition predicated on
philosophical and political commitments to the importance of informed
choice by citizens in the search for truth “to permit each person to develop
and exercise his or her capacities, thus promoting the sense of individual
self-worth.”208 And he showed particular skepticism for what he called
(after Professor Kalven) the “two-level” theory of speech, a theory in
which some speech is deemed wholly outside the protection of the First
Amendment.209 This theory, he thought, was justifiably on its way out. Yet,
he observed that “[o]ne last area where an offspring of the two-level theory
survived longer than it deserved is the area of advertising and ‘commercial
speech.’”210 “Just as the prohibition of government-imposed discrimination
on the basis of race is central to equal protection analysis,” he claimed,
“protection against governmental discrimination on the basis of speech
content is central among first amendment values.”211
When Professor Karst wrote this article, however, the commercial
speech doctrine itself was still a year away even though there had been, as
noted above, a few rumblings about protection for commercial speech. At
the time, the high value/low value debate seemed largely to revolve around
the pornography issue.212 So, it seems unlikely Karst intended to argue that
a host of regulatory institutions, ones considered legitimate for decades,

207.
Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) and Harry Kalven, Jr., The
New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT.
REV. 191 (1964)).
208.
Id. at 23.
209.
Id. at 30–35. Another way of expressing this is as “low value” versus “high value” speech.
See supra note 72.
210.
Karst, supra note 127, at 33 (emphasis added). He goes on to call this a “darkened . . . corner
of the first amendment until very recently.” Id. He then discusses several of the cases discussed in the
next Part, praising some as upholding the equality principle and criticizing others as inconsistent with it.
Yet, what is clear from the nature of the cases is that not one of them raised the questions that are raised
today under the banner of this equality principle—namely, whether marketing itself (not the particular
product or message but all marketing) is a “viewpoint” such that governmental regulation can be said to
offend content neutrality where it attempts to regulate it. Id. at 29–35. For a discussion of the distinction
between content-based versus viewpoint-based restrictions, see Stone, supra note 72.
211.
Karst, supra note 127, at 35. Some distinguished scholars have disputed this claim that
content neutrality has any place in First Amendment analysis of commercial speech. See Robert C. Post,
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 49 n.222 (2000–01) (“[T]he
distinction has virtually no application within the domain of commercial speech, where most regulation
is content based.”).
212.
See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 88 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(noting with respect to the Court’s upholding a zoning regulation of adult theaters that rigorous
enforcement of the First Amendment may protect “speech that seems to be of little or no value” but
“that is the price to be paid for constitutional freedom,” a construction that is very similar to that
adopted here by Justice Kennedy in Sorrell).
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should be dismantled. It seems even more doubtful that when he wrote
these words he had any inkling that, many years later, this idea of “equal
liberty” would be used as a justification for saying that the government
may not exclude multinational global corporations like GE, ExxonMobil,
Shell, Nike, or Microsoft from participating in political advertising or that
the First Amendment must shelter an array of marketing practices,
regardless of their negative social consequences.213 Yet, that is where
others would like to take it.
If it is hard to picture the large, multinational corporation as an
oppressed minority in need of the protection of the counter-majoritarian
power of the Court to counteract state-sanctioned discrimination, it is likely
that is because no one imagined it would come to that. Yet, once the
commercial speech doctrine was created, this “equal liberty” strand of
argument quickly served as a basis for arguments that a separate standard
of review for commercial speech amounted to content discrimination.
Over time, these two streams of thought—(1) that commercial speech
is valuable for consumers and should be protected on that basis and (2) that
the First Amendment encompasses an equal protection aspect that prohibits
courts from distinguishing amongst speakers or types of speech—would
(predictably) converge with a third legal principle—(3) that of corporate
personhood and corporations as holders of First Amendment rights—to
create the right of corporate political speech. It was perhaps especially
inevitable that these streams would converge given the enormous resources
devoted to making arguments in court and in law reviews that commercial
speech deserved full First Amendment protection.214
B. Nondiscrimination and Corporate Political Speech: “Content” as a
Stand-In for Speaker Rights
A mere two years after Virginia Pharmacy was decided, the Court
decided another seemingly unrelated case that shifted the Court’s focus to
the interests of the speaker and set the course that culminated in Sorrell—
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.215 In that case, the Court faced a

213.
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship at the Ground Level: The Consequences of
Nonstate Action, 54 DUKE L.J. 1591 (2005) (arguing that government should encourage and support
actions by private, nongovernmental actors to remedy discrimination).
214.
See supra note 203. At present there is no way to say for sure which (if any) of these articles
were subsidized by particular industries, underwritten by law firms, or commissioned in the manner
described in the Exxon punitive damages example in Epstein & Clarke, supra note 203. But it seems
unlikely that the number is zero. The record of amicus briefs in the various commercial speech cases
that have come before the Court since 1976 speak for themselves. This is, however, the subject for a
future article.
215.
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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challenge to a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporations from
spending money from their general treasuries to defeat or pass referenda
unless the referendum was one that affected the corporation’s business.216
The state’s Attorney General, Francis Bellotti, interpreted this provision to
forbid corporations from participating in advertising on a referendum
relating to personal property taxes.217 The First National Bank of Boston
disagreed and brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to have the
statute declared unconstitutional.218 The lower court had rejected the
Bank’s claim and upheld the statute.219 The Supreme Court reversed.220
Justice Powell, who only a few years before had been urging his friend
Eugene Sydnor, Jr. at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to engage in a fullscale, broad-ranging effort to rehabilitate the image of business,221 wrote
the opinion. Although the issue as framed by the parties and the lower court
had been whether the corporate identity of the speaker was determinative of
its First Amendment rights, this framing put the spotlight on the
corporation itself, which was not conducive to applying the usual rhetoric
about the need for self-expression as an attribute of human intellect, since
obviously, a corporation is not a human being. Justice Powell nimbly
sidestepped this difficulty, however, by reframing the question.
The court below framed the principal question in this case as
whether and to what extent corporations have First Amendment
rights. We believe that the court posed the wrong question. The
Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party
seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular,
serves significant societal interests. The proper question therefore
is not whether corporations “have” First Amendment rights and, if
so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons.
Instead, the question must be whether §8 abridges expression that
the First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it does.222
By redirecting the focus to the content of the speech, Powell essentially
ignored the issue as it had been presented. To propose that the question was
whether political advertising, as a category, was protected by the First

216.
Id. at 767–68.
217.
Id. at 769.
218.
Id. at 769–70.
219.
Id. at 771.
220.
Id. at 795.
221.
Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell to Eugene B. Syndor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, on Attack of American Free Enterprise System (Aug. 23, 1971), available at
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate_accountability/powell_memo_lewis.html.
222.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775–76 (emphasis added).
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Amendment was to answer it: of course it was. But, it meant that there
would be no deeper examination of whether any of the expressive purposes
of the First Amendment would be served by extending its protection to
private, commercial institutions or whether these entities needed the
protection of the courts in order to make their views known. Instead, the
Court framed the issue as one of the public’s right to hear all “viewpoints.”
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest
that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of
speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is
no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather
than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity
of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual.223
In this one paragraph (later to be repeated countless times, not only in
subsequent political speech cases, but in future submissions to the Court
and in some decisions issuing from the Court with respect to commercial
speech), the Court laid the foundation for a shift to focusing on a speakercentered analysis in the commercial speech doctrine.
The two-year-old commercial speech doctrine did not support a reading
that corporations’ protected speech was limited to its “business interests,”
Powell wrote.224 To the contrary, that precedent, like the protection for
political speech, was grounded in the public interest. “A commercial
advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains
to the seller’s business as because it furthers the societal interest in the
‘free flow of commercial information.’”225 This statement expressly
eschewed locating the protection for commercial speech or the new
protection for corporate political speech in the rights or needs of the
speaker. Yet, at the same time, the first quote conjures up notions of
equality, identity, antidiscrimination, and balance to frame the case as an
issue of civil rights and viewpoint discrimination. Bellotti reads as if
corporations can be said to have a “viewpoint” that would be systematically
suppressed unless the Court came to their rescue.
If a legislature may direct business corporations to “stick to
business,” it also may limit other corporations—religious,
charitable, or civic—to their respective “business” when

223.
224.
225.

Id. at 777 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 784.
Id. at 783 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the
expression of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment.
Especially where, as here, the legislature’s suppression of speech
suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question
an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First
Amendment is plainly offended.226
The opinion skillfully drew together various strands of First
Amendment jurisprudence, the long standing principle that corporations
were “persons” for purposes of the Constitution,227 and the newly minted
commercial speech doctrine to conclude that a rule that excluded speech
based on the identity of the speaker was inherently illegitimate and
discriminatory.228 In so doing, it made this decision seem like the natural
and inevitable outgrowth of the Court’s jurisprudence rather than a fairly
bold departure from it. This move shifted the balance of power over to
speakers with an assumption that, simply because a commercial entity
claimed it had something to say, it was necessarily in the public interest
that the entity have an unfettered right to do so.
Once again, Justice Rehnquist was not persuaded. “The question
presented today,” he wrote, “whether business corporations have a
constitutionally protected liberty to engage in political activities, has never
been squarely addressed by any previous decision of this Court.”229
Moreover, “[u]ntil recently, it was not thought that any persons, natural or

226.
Id. at 785–86 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Again, because the Court was avoiding
answering the question of just what the constitutional status of corporations was for purposes of the
First Amendment, it could elide the issue of whether there was a difference between for-profit and notfor-profit corporations for purposes of the protection of speech. Had the analysis focused on the
purposes of these disparate types of corporations, there may have been a basis for making a distinction
between these types of organizations. And, indeed, more than a decade later the Court did draw a
distinction between the status of for-profit and not-for-profit organization, holding that the government
could more readily regulate the political speech of the former than the latter. Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661–65 (1990). Austin was of course the case that the Citizens
United decision overturned.
227.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780 n.15 (“It has been settled for almost a century that corporations are
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co.,
118 U.S. 394 (1886)). What this footnote neglected to mention was that this decision had not resolved
the issue of whether corporations’ rights under that Amendment were exactly the same as human
beings’ rights. That issue hadn’t been decided in the Santa Clara case, and in fact, subsequent decisions
made clear that they were not completely parallel. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255
(1906) (protection for “liberty” under Fourteenth Amendment is limited to “natural, not artificial,
persons”). Thus, the degree of First Amendment protection artificial persons like corporations would
receive was precisely the question presented and precisely the one the majority refused to answer. This
footnote also made no mention of the somewhat controversial manner in which the Santa Clara Court
“settled” this question—“with neither argument nor discussion.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 822 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
228.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784–85.
229.
Id. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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artificial, had any protected right to engage in commercial speech.”230 And
“[a]lthough the Court has never explicitly recognized a corporation’s right
of commercial speech, such a right might be considered necessarily
incidental to the business of a commercial corporation.”231 This is not so of
the right to engage in political activities. “It cannot be so readily concluded
that the right of political expression is equally necessary to carry out the
functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes.”232 The
various states, Rehnquist observed, promulgate the laws under which
corporations of all types are organized, and those laws both define the
organizational purposes and provide a number of privileges that are
intended to facilitate those purposes, among which are perpetual life and
limited liability.233
However, he noted that: “It might reasonably be concluded that those
properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in
the political sphere. Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of
political expression are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for
which States permit commercial corporations to exist.”234 “Indeed, the
States might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic
power to obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed.”235 Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s reservations seem, from today’s vantage point,
extremely well founded.
VI. THE INCOHERENCE236 AND DANGERS OF SORRELL
As Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted, it has been hard for the Court to
maintain those “common sense” distinctions between commercial speech
and other protected speech. And to the extent that Bellotti was interpreted
by some to mean that different treatment for corporations or commercial
entities violated the First Amendment, the notion that the commercial
speech doctrine’s intermediate scrutiny standard was in some way
“discriminatory” became a persuasive argument industry would regularly

230.
Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
231.
Id.
232.
Id. (emphasis added).
233.
Id. at 824–26.
234.
Id. at 826 (emphasis added).
235.
Id.
236.
I use the word “incoherence” to connote what I view as the lack of logical coherence between
the different aspects of the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence and the Sorrell rationale. I do not
use the word in its other sense to mean “inarticulate” or incapable of articulating.
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use to argue that any attempted regulation of commercial speech, or indeed
liability for false statements, represented unconstitutional discrimination.237
It has apparently been a compelling argument to many of the Justices.
In the last part of the twentieth century and the beginning of this century
we have seen a “paradigm shift . . . in which the focus has moved from
consumer protection to speaker protection.”238 The rhetoric in Virginia
Pharmacy was “wrapped up in notions of informed consumer choice and
social utility. The case was not speaker-based but recipient-based.”239
Beginning sometime in the 1990s,240 “the emphasis seemed to change, with
greater attention paid to the rights of the commercial speaker.”241
Justice Rehnquist’s reservations about these new avenues of
constitutional protection that the Court had opened up reflect a
conservative approach in what is the older sense of the word, that is, a
cautious approach to change and an unwillingness to abandon the received
wisdom of the past in favor of an untested formulation. His stance on both
the commercial speech doctrine, as articulated in his dissents in Virginia
Pharmacy and Central Hudson, and to the extension of protection to
corporate speech in Bellotti, also reflected his commitment to a vision of
federalism and separation of powers that counseled deference to legislative
decisions, especially when they reflected “such a broad consensus . . . over
a period of many decades” as was the case with the restrictions on
corporate political speech in Bellotti.242 His form of conservatism did not
prevail.
One thing is clear: the commercial speech doctrine has undergone
significant revision in the course of the ensuing four decades since it was
announced. Its justifications today seem very far away from those
originally offered to support some protection for commercial speech under
the First Amendment, and the content-neutrality trope that Justice Kennedy
adopts in Sorrell suggests a comprehensiveness not found in the actual law.
As Professor Jack Balkin has pointed out, “the ideal of eliminating content
based regulation was never realized in practice.”243

237.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898–99 (2010); Piety, supra note
14, at 19.
238.
Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500!: The Debate over Corporate Speech and the First
Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277, 1295–96 (2004).
239.
Id. at 1296.
240.
Probably the case that signaled the shift was City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507
U.S. 410 (1993) discussed earlier.
241.
Smolla, supra note 238, at 1296.
242.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
243.
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism, supra note 202, at 396.
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[D]espite the constitutionalization of defamation and privacy law
begun with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, many common law
rules of libel and slander, which were quite directly concerned with
content, remained intact. . . . And this is to say nothing of the wellknown examples of fraud, perjury, and professional malpractice,
which have never been considered “speech” for purposes of the
first amendment.244
In this respect, the ideal of content neutrality is like the proposition that
it is possible for the courts to adopt an “absolutist” position on the First
Amendment and protect everything that is speech; this is simply not
possible since it would potentially make vast swathes of ordinary contract
law unconstitutional.245
But even as he uses a content-neutrality test that is particularly
solicitous of speakers’ freedom, Justice Kennedy nevertheless continues to
justify protection for commercial speech as protecting listeners’ interests.
Content-based restrictions cannot be upheld, he writes, on the grounds that
people might make bad decisions with that information.246 “‘The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to
keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own
good.’”247
But the listener benefit, Kennedy proposes, is one that is anchored
more in theory than in the facts of the case. Doctors lobbied for this law. To
be sure, some doctors find detailing visits from reps who know their
prescriptions practices to be helpful,248 but the Vermont law permitted
physicians who felt this way to opt into information sharing. It did not in
any way prevent those doctors from having the benefit of this
“information” while it permitted those who objected to the practice to
prohibit the sale of their private information. To those physicians who
might protest that they did not want to receive this information and, in fact,
wanted to marshal the power of the state to protect them from having their
private information used against them in ways they believed might
compromise their professional judgment, Justice Kennedy responded as
244.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
245.
See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270–71 (1981).
246.
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–71 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)).
247.
Id. at 2671 (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996)).
248.
See Silverman, The Death of the Sales Rep, supra note 21, describing a survey that found that
a majority of doctors find visits from drug reps “very” or “somewhat” helpful. It is not clear however
whether survey respondents meant to include access to the doctor’s prescribing information as part of
what they found made the reps visits helpful.
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follows: “Many are those who must endure speech they do not like, but that
is a necessary cost of freedom.”249
This is rather grand language to use about protecting the ability of
pharmaceutical representatives to engage in the “hard sell.” Nothing in the
original Virginia Pharmacy opinion suggested that the Court intended to
expand the First Amendment so dramatically. In fact, the Court has
repeatedly ignored invitations in cases like Nike, Inc. v. Kasky250 to abolish
commercial speech’s “subordinate” position—and with good reason. It is
difficult to say how many laws would be implicated by such a radical
recalibrating of the balance between the First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause.
What is most at risk is the government’s ability to regulate fraud251
because the strict scrutiny standard of review is often said to be “‘strict’ in
theory and fatal in fact.”252 The Nike case illustrates this difficulty. It
involved a lawsuit against Nike brought by a consumer activist, Kasky,
who claimed that many of the public statements Nike made about its labor
practices were false and alleged that these false statements constituted a
violation of California’s false advertising and unfair trade practices laws,
fraud, and deceit.253 Nike filed a demurrer (motion to dismiss) arguing that
all of the statements were made in forums that were traditionally
considered protected by the First Amendment, such as letters to the editor
or issue ads.254 The lower courts agreed, but the California Supreme Court
disagreed, finding that at least some of Nike’s speech might be considered
commercial speech and thus, only protected if it were truthful.255 Nike
appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court arguing that the standard that
should apply was the strict scrutiny standard of New York Times v.
Sullivan.256 The Court heard argument but ultimately dismissed the case on
the grounds that certiorari had been improvidently granted.257 Yet, the
concurring and dissenting opinions to the dismissal suggested that there
was some sympathy on the Court to Nike’s argument.258 But would we
really want New York Times v. Sullivan’s “breathing room” for false

249.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669 (emphasis added).
250.
539 U.S. 654 (2003).
251.
For a more full treatment of this issue see Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s
Quest for a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 151 (2005).
252.
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
253.
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002).
254.
Id. at 302.
255.
Id. at 262.
256.
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 659–60 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring).
257.
Id. at 655 (per curiam).
258.
Id. at 656–84 (Stevens, J., concurring; Thomas, J., dissenting).
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statements to be the standard against which we measure claims of
commercial fraud?
Strict scrutiny may not justify a motion to dismiss, but it will often
support a motion for summary judgment. And although recent research
suggests that the “fatal in fact” aphorism is somewhat exaggerated,259 it is
still the case that strict scrutiny review would be distinctly more fatal to the
regulation of commercial speech than the rational basis review that
normally is applied to the regulation of commerce. “Although Gunther’s
famous adage arose in the context of equal protection, strict scrutiny is
actually most fatal in the area of free speech, where the survival rate is 22
percent, lower than in any other right.”260
This feature of strict scrutiny ought to be a matter of grave concern.
Much of the work of the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and countless other governmental agencies is
predicated on the government’s ability to pursue and punish not only fraud,
but also statements which may be misleading or on the government’s
ability to require various disclosures in order to conduct certain businesses.
After Sorrell, many of these laws will be challenged.
But the agency most clearly in the crosshairs of industry assault is the
Food and Drug Administration. The Food and Drug Administration
prohibits pharmaceutical sales reps from marketing drugs that have been
approved by the agency for use for one purpose in another unapproved,
“off-label” use.261 Numerous drug companies have paid millions, if not
billions, of dollars in fines for off-label use marketing violations.262
Predictably, they have argued the First Amendment protects their right to
promote these drugs for a purpose for which they have not been
prescribed.263 After Sorrell, the off-label use marketing prohibition may be
endangered.

259.
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 869 (2006).
260.
Id. at 844 (emphasis added). It is also important to note that while Winkler broke down the
category of the First Amendment into several separate categories, commercial speech was not one of
them. Moreover, given the subsequent decisions of the Court, in Citizens United and Sorrell in
particular, it is unclear how predictive this analysis would be for future cases. Although it is
theoretically possible that the Court’s expansive grant of protection to commercial speech will inspire
courts to interpret it in a manner that preserves more of the status quo, I am not terribly sanguine about
that prospect.
261.
21 U.S.C.A. § 331(a) (West 2012). For a discussion of one of the recent cases, see Natasha
Singer, Maker of Botox Settles Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010 at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/business/02allergan.html.
262.
Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009
at B4, available at http://nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.html.
263.
See, e.g., Editorial, FDA’s Off-Label Rule Under Attack, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/07/opinion/la-ed-drugs-20111107 (“[S]ome drug makers are
pushing back in court, arguing that the FDA’s marketing limits violate their 1st Amendment rights.”).
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The potential harms arising from the aggressive promotion of new
drugs that have not been thoroughly tested should be apparent from the
Vioxx debacle, in which thousands of people died from adverse cardiac
impacts of the drug.264 In fact, the issues with Vioxx only fully emerged
after the drug had been approved through what are known as “seeding
trials.” Seeding trials are designed to look like clinical studies, but they are,
in fact, orchestrated by the marketing department, not the research arm of
the company.265 They are intended to get key doctors, those identified as
“opinion leaders,” to prescribe the drug and recommend it to others.266 In
addition, in some cases academics have allowed their names to be used on
articles ghostwritten by drug company employees and have not disclosed
this fact.267 Sorrell implicates the FDA’s ability to regulate that practice.
Yet another example is the FDA’s recent rules regulating cigarette
packaging. They have already been successfully attacked on the grounds
that the regulations violate the tobacco companies’ freedom of
expression.268 And these are just two examples in one area of regulatory
authority—the FDA.269 What of the FTC? The SEC? The EPA?
In his dissent, Justice Breyer asserted that the majority’s reasoning in
Sorrell “reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial
for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at
issue.”270 How Lochner-esque Sorrell is as a matter of doctrine I leave to
Not surprisingly there are several law review articles which urge that the prohibition on off-label use
marketing is unconstitutional. See Lora E. Barnhart Driscolla, Citizens United v. Central Hudson: A
Rationale for Simplifying and Clarifying the First Amendment’s Protection for Nonpolitical
Advertisements, 19 GEO. MASON L REV. 213 (2011); Kristie LaSalle, A Prescription for Change:
Citizens United’s Implications for Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Prescription Pharmaceuticals,
19 J. L. & POL’Y 867 (2011); John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on
Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 299
(2010).
264.
See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 59, at 265–78 (describing the Vioxx and COX-2 inhibitors
scandal); Jost, supra note 21, at 344.
265.
Kevin Hill, MD, MHS; Joseph S. Ross, MD, MHS; David S. Egilman, MD, MPH; and Harlan
M. Krumholz, MS, SM, The ADVANTAGE Seeding Trial: A Review of Internal Documents, 149
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 251 (2008).
266.
Id.
267.
Joseph S. Ross, MD, MHS; Kevin P. Hill, MD, MPH; David S. Egilman, MD, MPH; Harlan
M. Krumholz, MD, SM, Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related to Rofecoxib, 299
JAMA 1800 (2008).
268.
R.J. Reynolds v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011), vacated,
Nos. 11–5332, 12–5063, 2012 WL 3632003 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2012) (reviewing the law under what
looks like strict scrutiny, despite nominally applying Central Hudson, and finding it unconstitutional).
See also Commonwealth Brands v. U.S., 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky 2010) (declining to apply strict
scrutiny but nevertheless finding portions of the law unconstitutional).
269.
For more examples, see David S. Egilman & Susanna Rankin Bohme, Over a Barrel:
Corporate Corruption of Science and Its Effects on Workers and the Environment, 11 INT. J. OCCUP.
ENVTL. HEALTH 331 (2005); Christopher T. Robertson, The Money Blind: How to Stop Industry Bias in
Biomedical Science, Without Violating the First Amendment, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 358 (2011).
270.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2685 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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others,271 but it is obviously substantially more difficult to regulate
commerce if you cannot regulate commercial speech. Apparently as a retort
to Justice Breyer’s observation, Justice Kennedy invoked Justice Holmes’
famous Lochner dissent and observed that while the Constitution “‘does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics’ . . . [i]t does enact the First
Amendment.”272
The irony here, of course, is that the Constitution also enacts the
Commerce Clause. And the justification originally offered for giving any
First Amendment protection to commercial speech was the protection of a
“free enterprise economy,” an observation which prompted Justice
Rehnquist to protest that the Constitution also did not enact the philosophy
of Adam Smith.273 Justice Kennedy apparently believes that it did under the
guise of the First Amendment. It would be difficult to conceive of a clearer
declaration of supremacy in the struggle between the First Amendment and
the Commerce Clause. Yet, it seems unlikely that the First Amendment was
intended to undo the Commerce Clause.
CONCLUSION
For now, we know how this story ends. By the year 2010, the
commercial speech doctrine had evolved into a test that was strict scrutiny
in all but name, although the Court continued to recognize a distinction
between commercial and non-commercial speech. Then came Citizens
United, and its muscular version of corporate personhood. Given the
interpenetration of the commercial and corporate political speech doctrines,
it seemed only a matter of time before the Court imported that very robust,
speaker-centric vision into the commercial speech doctrine. It only took a
year.
Yet Sorrell is in many ways, if not a more dangerous opinion for
democracy than Citizens United, at least an equally dangerous one. In
Sorrell, the Court took a doctrine that was conceived of as a species of
consumer protection, and justified as furthering the public interest, and

271.
The correct constitutional interpretation of Lochner is beyond the scope of this piece. Suffice
it to say that Breyer’s use of Lochner suggests he believes it is presumptively illegitimate or, as Balkin
might say, part of the “anti-canon” in constitutional law. See Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided,”
supra note 17. That Justice Kennedy’s opinion doesn’t really challenge that claim to anti-canonical
status but rather offers something like a “so what?” could be argued as evidence of Balkin’s theory that
Lochner’s status as anti-canon is sufficiently in dispute that Kennedy feels free to disregard it. On the
other hand, one could read his failure to defend Lochner more forcefully (along the revisionist line
Balkin discusses) as confirmation of its continued anti-canonical status.
272.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
273.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 784 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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turned it into a weapon against Vermont’s effort to protect consumers and
the public health, safety, and welfare. It took a doctrine that was supposed
to give the listeners more autonomy and freedom to make their own
decisions and used it to deny those listeners control over their own
information. And because it did all this without explicitly overruling
Central Hudson or acknowledging that it was announcing a new standard
by which to evaluate commercial speech, the Court rendered the
commercial speech doctrine incoherent and sowed further confusion about
what the appropriate test is. Armed with this new (and inherently
contradictory) “content-neutrality” inquiry, the Supreme Court is in a
position to pick and choose and selectively invalidate those parts of the
regulation of commerce brought to it with which its majority disagrees.
It is too soon to say what the Court will do with these new powers that
it has appropriated for itself to subject economic regulation to substantive
rather than deferential review. But, it seems safe to say that if these last two
Terms offer any hints, its exercise of this review power is not likely to be
“conservative” in the traditional sense.
The rhetoric of content neutrality and equal rights for corporate
speakers obscures that the entities and interests being protected here are
some of the world’s most powerful institutions, institutions with enormous,
some would say excessive, influence in the legislative process to obtain
favorable laws. They do not need to marshal the counter-majoritarian
power of the courts to preserve their rights against an oppressive minority
in the electorate. Nor are they human beings with inherent political rights.
Rather, they are creatures of law meant to serve the public interest, not to
dominate it. To argue that selling toothpaste is of the same significance as
political protest and to put commercial speakers on par with those engaging
in lunch counter sit-ins is to trivialize the whole notion of civil rights. The
Commerce Clause arguably points to the legitimacy of subordinating
commercial expression to other sorts of expression. False or misleading
commercial speech can pose grave dangers to the public and distort proper
market function. Not only is it not a “necessary cost of freedom” to offer
full First Amendment protection to commercial speech, it may be a
necessary cost of freedom to keep it in check.

